Launchpad hook on Ethereum

Uniswap v4 Hook Contract 0x3906fd44bc84e9c59877fe6a33df120929b080cc on Ethereum · Launchpad

Volume (24h)
$16.50K
Value locked (TVL)
$7.75K
All-time volume
$16.50K
Pools using this hook
1
Swaps (24h)
94 (42 traders)
Total swaps
94

What it does

This hook appears to launch and bootstrap new token pools and takes a fee-like share of swaps through return deltas, but the exact direction and size of that charge cannot be confirmed without verified source.

How it works step by step

  • Exposes a large set of launch and pool setup entry points (create, launch, register, setup, initialize, configure, open, start) that all take a token address, fee tier, tick spacing and sqrt price, indicating it bootstraps new pools for tokens
  • Hook permissions enable beforeSwap, afterSwap, beforeSwapReturnDelta and afterSwapReturnDelta, so the hook can alter swap amounts and take or give currency during swaps
  • Storage tracks a pool key and a pair token, an owner-like address slot, and mappings of addresses to booleans that look like allowlists or exemption lists
  • Includes staking, claim, deposit, mint, burn and fund style functions alongside supply and seed functions, suggesting a rewards or token distribution mechanism around the launched token
  • Uses an unlock callback and performUpkeep style entry points, indicating automated or keeper-triggered actions that move funds
Swap behaviour
beforeSwap and afterSwap are implemented and can return deltas, so the hook can take or give currency on swaps; the exact fee or amount logic cannot be confirmed from decoded bytecode.
Liquidity behaviour
beforeAddLiquidity, afterAddLiquidity, beforeRemoveLiquidity and afterRemoveLiquidity selectors are present as view-style decoded functions, but the hook does not enable liquidity hook permissions, so liquidity callbacks are not invoked by the pool manager.
Fee behaviour
Uses the pool's static fee as far as the hook permissions show; no fee-setting function was identified with certainty, though burn-fee related storage and a MAX_BURN_FEE_BPS getter suggest a burn fee applied to trades.
Owner & admin controls
An owner or operator address appears to be stored and some functions write to access-style mappings, but no verified source confirms who can pause, upgrade or change parameters.

Enabled Uniswap v4 callbacks

beforeSwap, afterSwap, beforeSwapReturnDelta, afterSwapReturnDelta

beforeSwap is used to run pre-swap logic and can return a delta; afterSwap runs post-swap accounting and can return a delta; beforeSwapReturnDelta and afterSwapReturnDelta allow the hook to take a share of swap currency.

Security & trust assessment

Risk level: high, estimated (decoded bytecode, low confidence).

Who controls it: A privileged key appears able to configure and initialize pools, set exemptions and possibly trigger upkeep or funding actions, which could change how swaps are charged or who receives value.

Risk to user funds: The hook can take currency via return deltas on swaps and can move tokens through transfers and settlement, so user and pool funds are exposed to its logic.

Security findings

  • [high] Return deltas on swaps: The hook enables beforeSwapReturnDelta and afterSwapReturnDelta, so it can take or redirect currency from every swap, which directly affects traders.
  • [medium] Currency movement and token transfers: Heuristics show the hook moves currency and calls transfer, transferFrom and take/settle, so it can hold or move pool and user funds.
  • [medium] Privileged access mappings: Several mappings of addresses to booleans are written by multiple setup functions, implying admin-gated roles that could change pool configuration or exempt addresses from rules.
  • [medium] Unverified source: No verified source is available, so the exact fee, burn and upgrade logic cannot be fully audited.

Contract details

Verified source
No
Bytecode size
21,139 bytes
Upgradeable proxy
No
Detected patterns
erc20, erc6909-claims, launchpad, moves-currency, return-delta, rewards, self-unlock

Pools using Launchpad hook