Hook 0x6a08…00cc on Ethereum

Uniswap v4 Hook Contract 0x6a0827b1c3d998da17d5252c741b6a29539600cc on Ethereum · Other

Volume (24h)
$13.28K
Value locked (TVL)
$0
All-time volume
$13.28K
Pools using this hook
1
Swaps (24h)
112 (38 traders)
Total swaps
112

What it does

An unverified Uniswap v4 hook that intercepts swaps with return-delta permissions and appears to bundle token launch and withdrawal utilities, so its exact effect on traders and LPs cannot be confirmed from bytecode alone.

How it works step by step

  • Enables beforeSwap and afterSwap callbacks with return-delta permissions, so it can change swap accounting
  • Bytecode contains unlock, take, settle and sync calls, indicating it settles currency with the pool manager
  • Exposes launch, create, setup and init style selectors, suggesting pool or token deployment helpers
  • Exposes withdrawToken, claim, stake and fund style selectors, suggesting reward or treasury functions
  • Stores admin-style address mappings and flags that are written by privileged selectors
Swap behaviour
beforeSwap and afterSwap run on every swap and can return deltas that alter or take amounts, based on the decoded permissions; the precise logic is not recoverable without source.
Liquidity behaviour
Has beforeAddLiquidity, afterAddLiquidity, beforeRemoveLiquidity and afterRemoveLiquidity selectors in its ABI, but no liquidity hook permissions are enabled on the address, so these callbacks are not invoked by the pool manager.
Fee behaviour
Unclear from decoded bytecode; the hook has beforeSwap and afterSwap return-delta permissions, so it may adjust or take fees, but the fee logic cannot be determined.
Owner & admin controls
Storage slot 7 is written by 0x710c2fe5 and 0xa69df4b5 and slot 8 mapping is written by several setter-like selectors (0x5131442a, 0x8316d2ef, 0x8371643e, 0x9b29c7db), suggesting an access-controlled admin set of addresses; the exact owner or whitelist mechanics cannot be confirmed without source.

Enabled Uniswap v4 callbacks

beforeSwap, afterSwap, beforeSwapReturnDelta, afterSwapReturnDelta

beforeSwap: runs before each swap and can return a delta to the pool manager. afterSwap: runs after each swap and can return a delta. beforeSwapReturnDelta: lets beforeSwap alter the swap amounts or take currency from the pool. afterSwapReturnDelta: lets afterSwap alter the resulting amounts or take currency from the pool.

Security & trust assessment

Risk level: high (decoded bytecode, low confidence).

Who controls it: Admin-role storage (slots 7 to 11 and the address mapping) suggests privileged addresses that could alter hook behaviour or sweep balances; the scope of their powers is unknown without source.

Risk to user funds: Because beforeSwapReturnDelta and afterSwapReturnDelta are enabled and the bytecode can unlock the pool manager and move currency, the hook can hold, take or redirect swap amounts; with privileged withdrawal paths, pool and user funds could be affected by the admin.

Security findings

  • [high] Hook can move pool currency through return deltas: The hook enables return-delta permissions and its bytecode contains moves-currency and self-unlock patterns (unlock, take, settle, sync), so it can take or pay tokens from pool accounting during swaps.
  • [medium] Privileged withdrawal and configuration functions: Selectors for withdrawToken, claim, and token-related flows, plus a mapping written by admin-style selectors, suggest owner-controlled withdrawal or configuration paths.
  • [medium] Unverified source code: The contract has no verified source, so logic cannot be audited and the function names shown are decoded selectors only.
  • [info] Multi-purpose entry points: Pattern of launch, create, setup and init selectors with a token-related storage layout suggests the hook may be a launchpad or token-deployment helper bundled with swap hooks.

Contract details

Verified source
No
Bytecode size
21,019 bytes
Upgradeable proxy
No
Detected patterns
erc6909-claims, moves-currency, return-delta, self-unlock

Pools using Hook 0x6a08…00cc