Launchpad hook on Ethereum

Uniswap v4 Hook Contract 0x76bd2b8191fef1da2e060e4f960c2718eae940cc on Ethereum · Launchpad

Volume (24h)
$0
Value locked (TVL)
$0
All-time volume
$0
Pools using this hook
1
Swaps (24h)
272 (101 traders)
Total swaps
272

What it does

This hook runs on every swap and can take a share of swap amounts through return deltas, while its launch, staking and burn functions manage the token's pool and rewards; because the fee logic is not readable, it is unclear which trades pay more or less.

How it works step by step

  • Exposes many launch-style entry points (launch, create, register, setup, start, open, init, configure, createPool) that initialize a pool keyed on a token pair with a fee tier and tick spacing, indicating a token launch or pool bootstrapping flow.
  • Implements beforeSwap and afterSwap hooks that can return deltas, so the hook can adjust amounts taken or given during a swap.
  • Implements beforeAddLiquidity, afterAddLiquidity, beforeRemoveLiquidity and afterRemoveLiquidity selectors, which are present in the dispatch table but are not enabled in the address permissions.
  • Contains reward and staking selectors (stake, claim, deposit, fund, supply, seed, mint, burn, totalBurned, MAX_BURN_FEE_BPS), suggesting a burn or reward distribution mechanism tied to the token.
  • Contains an unlockCallback and unlock/execute/exec/relay selectors, meaning the hook drives the pool manager unlock flow and settles or takes currency during swaps.
  • Storage slot reads and writes show a manager, pool key and pair token address are stored, plus allowlist-style mappings and boolean flags controlling behaviour.
Swap behaviour
beforeSwap and afterSwap run on every swap of the pool. Return deltas are enabled, so the hook can take or give a portion of the swap amounts. Which trades pay more or less cannot be determined from the decoded bytecode alone.
Liquidity behaviour
Liquidity add and remove callbacks are not enabled in the hook permissions, so the pool manager does not call them. Liquidity is managed through the hook's own entry points (add, supply, deposit, fund, seed) and unlock flow.
Fee behaviour
Uses the pool's static fee plus any amounts taken through return deltas in swap callbacks; the exact fee logic cannot be determined without source. A MAX_BURN_FEE_BPS constant and a totalBurned counter suggest a burn fee component.
Owner & admin controls
Owner-style controls are not identifiable with certainty from the decoded selectors. Allowlist mappings (exempt, and mappings written by several setup selectors) and boolean flags are set by functions in the dispatch table, so an authorised role likely controls exemptions and configuration. Pausing or upgrade capability cannot be confirmed.

Enabled Uniswap v4 callbacks

beforeSwap, afterSwap, beforeSwapReturnDelta, afterSwapReturnDelta

beforeSwap: gates or adjusts swaps before execution and can return a delta. afterSwap: runs post-swap accounting and can return a delta that moves currency. beforeSwapReturnDelta and afterSwapReturnDelta: allow the hook to take currency from the swap. No liquidity callbacks are enabled.

Security & trust assessment

Risk level: high, estimated (decoded bytecode, low confidence).

Who controls it: A key with the ability to call setup or configure functions, or to set allowlist flags, could alter fees or exemptions and could potentially block swaps. Whether these functions are restricted to an owner could not be verified.

Risk to user funds: The hook can take currency through return deltas during swaps and holds token balances for staking, rewards and burns, so user funds can be moved or affected by hook logic. It can also block swaps through the beforeSwap path.

Security findings

  • [high] Return deltas can move user funds: beforeSwapReturnDelta and afterSwapReturnDelta are enabled, so the hook can take a share of each swap amount. The magnitude of the take depends on logic that cannot be read without source.
  • [medium] Unverified privileged configuration: Multiple setup, configure and init selectors write to shared storage slots and allowlist mappings. A privileged caller could change pool parameters or exemptions, but the access checks could not be confirmed from bytecode.
  • [medium] Swap gating via beforeSwap: beforeSwap is called before every swap and can revert, so a flag or pause set through the hook could block trading in the pool.
  • [info] Burn and reward flows reach tokens: Burn, mint and reward selectors indicate the hook holds or mints tokens and pays out rewards, which increases the surface for accounting errors.

Contract details

Verified source
No
Bytecode size
21,615 bytes
Upgradeable proxy
No
Detected patterns
erc20, erc6909-claims, launchpad, moves-currency, return-delta, rewards, self-unlock

Pools using Launchpad hook