Launchpad hook on Ethereum

Uniswap v4 Hook Contract 0x80ad2142212a185c0041ee3d506e59c6c52b00cc on Ethereum · Launchpad

Volume (24h)
$0
Value locked (TVL)
$0
All-time volume
$0
Pools using this hook
1
Swaps (24h)
265 (82 traders)
Total swaps
265

What it does

This launchpad-style hook takes a cut of swaps through return deltas and routes it to burns or rewards, but the exact rate and which traders pay more or less could not be confirmed from the decoded bytecode.

How it works step by step

  • Hook exposes launch, setup, create, register, initialize and open style entry points that configure a pool with a token pair, fee tier, tick spacing and starting price.
  • Uses beforeSwap and afterSwap with return deltas, so it can take or give back part of a swap amount before and after the pool executes it.
  • Reads and writes a set of allow-list style mappings keyed by address (exempt, whitelist-like checks) that gate some callers.
  • Contains a self-unlock path (unlock, unlockCallback) and calls back into the pool manager to modify liquidity and settle balances.
  • Includes staking, claim, deposit, mint, burn and reward selectors plus an upkeep hook, indicating a reward or token distribution mechanism tied to swap activity.
  • Tracks a burn counter (totalBurned, MAX_BURN_FEE_BPS) suggesting part of the swap-derived amount is burned rather than returned to LPs.
Swap behaviour
beforeSwap and afterSwap are both enabled with return-delta permissions, so the hook can alter the amounts settled on a swap; the exact split between trader, LP, burn and reward recipients cannot be fully determined from decoded bytecode.
Liquidity behaviour
beforeAddLiquidity, beforeRemoveLiquidity, afterAddLiquidity and afterRemoveLiquidity selectors exist in the dispatch table but are not listed as enabled hook permissions, so they are likely unused by the pool; the hook can still call modifyLiquidity itself through its unlock flow.
Fee behaviour
The hook appears to take a fee or burn portion of swap value via return deltas; the precise rate source (static constant, owner-set, or dynamic) could not be confirmed from decoded bytecode, but a MAX_BURN_FEE_BPS cap is present.
Owner & admin controls
Owner-style controls are not clearly identified; the contract has a tracking flag, an exempt mapping, pause-like boolean slots, and multiple initializer selectors that may be callable by any caller. Upgradeability is not evident from the decoded selectors but cannot be ruled out.

Enabled Uniswap v4 callbacks

beforeSwap, afterSwap, beforeSwapReturnDelta, afterSwapReturnDelta

beforeSwap: gates or adjusts the swap and can return a delta to take value from it. afterSwap: runs after execution, likely to account fees, rewards or burns and can return a delta. beforeSwapReturnDelta and afterSwapReturnDelta: allow the hook to take or give currency amounts, which is the mechanism that moves funds.

Security & trust assessment

Risk level: high, estimated (decoded bytecode, low confidence).

Who controls it: A privileged key that controls the exempt/allow mappings or the configuration selectors could change which addresses pay fees and which pools are live, and could reconfigure launch parameters.

Risk to user funds: The hook can take or give currency through return deltas during swaps and can call the pool manager to settle and move balances, so user swap amounts are directly exposed to the hook's fee, burn and reward logic.

Security findings

  • [high] Return deltas can move user funds: beforeSwapReturnDelta and afterSwapReturnDelta are enabled, so the hook can take a share of each swap, including burn and reward cuts, directly from the swap amounts.
  • [medium] Multiple setup and initializer entry points: Many selectors (launch, setup, create, register, init, open, configure) accept pool parameters; if access checks are weak, anyone could reconfigure or re-initialize launch state for a pool.
  • [medium] Allow-list mappings gate behaviour: Mappings keyed by address are read during swap and other flows, so a privileged role may be able to exempt or block addresses from fees or execution.
  • [info] Burn and reward accounting unverified: totalBurned and reward selectors suggest value is burned or distributed; without source the exact accounting cannot be verified.

Contract details

Verified source
No
Bytecode size
21,478 bytes
Upgradeable proxy
No
Detected patterns
erc20, erc6909-claims, launchpad, moves-currency, return-delta, rewards, self-unlock

Pools using Launchpad hook