Launchpad hook on Ethereum

Uniswap v4 Hook Contract 0x82343c199abd9ce6e4a9873325f811a0a68fc0cc on Ethereum · Launchpad

Volume (24h)
$10.65K
Value locked (TVL)
$0
All-time volume
$10.65K
Pools using this hook
1
Swaps (24h)
151 (47 traders)
Total swaps
151

What it does

This hook appears to run a token-launch and reward mechanism on Uniswap v4 pools that can adjust swap deltas and move currency, but the exact fee direction and who pays more or less cannot be determined from the decoded bytecode.

How it works step by step

  • Exposes a large set of launch, register, setup, create and init entry points that all share the same (address, uint24, int24, address, uint160) pool-parameter shape, indicating it creates or configures Uniswap v4 pools for token launches.
  • Implements beforeSwap and afterSwap callbacks with return-delta permissions, so it can alter swap amounts and take or give currency during swaps.
  • Implements an unlockCallback and self-unlock path, meaning it calls back into the pool manager to settle balances on its own behalf.
  • Includes staking, claim, deposit, fund, seed, mint and burn style functions plus a totalBurned counter, suggesting a token-burn or reward distribution mechanism tied to swap activity.
  • Includes performUpkeep and multicall/batch/exec/relay entry points, suggesting automated or keeper-driven execution of hook logic.
Swap behaviour
beforeSwap and afterSwap are implemented with return-delta permissions, so the hook can modify the swap delta and move currency during swaps; the exact fee or redistribution logic cannot be confirmed from decoded bytecode alone.
Liquidity behaviour
beforeAddLiquidity, afterAddLiquidity, beforeRemoveLiquidity and afterRemoveLiquidity selectors are present as view-style decoded functions, but the hook permissions do not enable liquidity callbacks, so liquidity actions are not expected to be intercepted by the hook.
Fee behaviour
Uses the pool's static fee as far as the enabled permissions show; any fee redirection or burn applied through beforeSwapReturnDelta or afterSwapReturnDelta cannot be confirmed from decoded bytecode.
Owner & admin controls
Owner-style storage slots and mapping(address=>bool) access lists exist, with functions such as exempt, setup and configure, and storage slot 5 used as a boolean toggle; the exact owner, pause and upgrade authority cannot be confirmed without source.

Enabled Uniswap v4 callbacks

beforeSwap, afterSwap, beforeSwapReturnDelta, afterSwapReturnDelta

beforeSwap: gating and pre-swap logic that can change the swap delta. afterSwap: post-swap accounting and possible currency movement. beforeSwapReturnDelta: lets the hook return a delta that alters the swap amounts. afterSwapReturnDelta: lets the hook take or return a delta after the swap.

Security & trust assessment

Risk level: high, estimated (decoded bytecode, low confidence).

Who controls it: A privileged key may be able to set access lists, configure pool parameters, trigger burns or rewards and control launch logic, which could change outcomes for traders and LPs.

Risk to user funds: The hook can hold, take and move tokens through return-delta and currency-movement mechanisms during swaps and settlement, so user and pool funds may be taken or redirected.

Security findings

  • [high] Return-delta permissions on swaps: beforeSwapReturnDelta and afterSwapReturnDelta let the hook alter swap amounts and take currency from the flow, so users may receive less than quoted.
  • [medium] Currency movement and token transfers: Selectors for transfer, transferFrom, approve, take and settle are present, so the hook can move tokens it holds or pulls from users and pool flows.
  • [medium] Privileged admin and access lists: Multiple mapping(address=>bool) access slots and owner-style functions indicate privileged roles that can change behaviour without source verification.
  • [medium] Possible burn and reward accounting: totalBurned and burn/mint/stake/claim selectors suggest the hook mints or burns tokens and distributes rewards, which can affect token supply and LP or trader value.
  • [info] No source verification: Analysis relies on decoded bytecode and selector names only, so the exact logic and authority model are inferred rather than confirmed.

Contract details

Verified source
No
Bytecode size
21,553 bytes
Upgradeable proxy
No
Detected patterns
erc20, erc6909-claims, launchpad, moves-currency, return-delta, rewards, self-unlock

Pools using Launchpad hook