Launchpad hook on Ethereum

Volume (24h)

$0

Value locked (TVL)

$0

All-time volume

$0

Pools using this hook

1

Swaps (24h)

93 (42 traders)

Total swaps

93

What it does

This hook appears to bootstrap token launch pools and adds swap-time reward, burn and delta logic that can alter what traders pay or receive, though the exact direction and size of those effects cannot be confirmed without source.

How it works step by step

• Exposes many launch, create, setup, init and register style entry points that all take a pool key tuple and a sqrt price, indicating it bootstraps new pools for token launches
• Implements beforeSwap and afterSwap callbacks that run on every swap of pools it is attached to
• Uses beforeSwapReturnDelta and afterSwapReturnDelta, so it can return a delta that changes the amounts settled for swappers
• Tracks state in several storage slots including mappings of addresses to booleans, which suggests allowlists or exemption flags, and an exempt(address) view
• Implements an unlockCallback and unlock path and calls take, settle, sync and modifyLiquidity on the pool manager, so it moves currency during swaps
• Includes reward and claim style functions such as stake, claim, supply, deposit, fund, mint and burn, plus ERC6909 claim tags and a totalBurned counter

Swap behaviour

beforeSwap and afterSwap run on every swap. Both can return deltas that alter settled amounts, and the hook can move currency during the swap. The exact fee or price effect on buys versus sells cannot be determined from the bytecode alone.

Liquidity behaviour

beforeAddLiquidity, afterAddLiquidity, beforeRemoveLiquidity and afterRemoveLiquidity selectors are present as views in the dispatch table, which suggests they are defined but the decoded bytecode does not show gating or changes to liquidity; their logic cannot be confirmed.

Fee behaviour

The hook does not appear to set a dynamic fee since no dynamic fee permission is enabled, and it uses return deltas on swaps. Fee sharing, burn or reward splitting may occur through those deltas, but the exact split cannot be determined from the decoded bytecode.

Owner & admin controls

A mapping at storage slot 8 is written by selectors 2f02addd, 64b5dd8a, d26f171e and d9f71523, and slot 13 is written by 05bc57f4, 1e9fc211 and 89497d26, which suggests owner or operator role management. Pause style flags are written at slots 7 and 10. Upgrade or proxy behaviour is not evident. The exact authority model cannot be confirmed without source.

Enabled Uniswap v4 callbacks

beforeSwap, afterSwap, beforeSwapReturnDelta, afterSwapReturnDelta

beforeSwap: gates or adjusts each swap before execution. afterSwap: runs post-swap accounting and reward or burn updates. beforeSwapReturnDelta: returns a delta that changes the amounts settled in the swap. afterSwapReturnDelta: returns a post-swap delta that can take or give currency.

Security & trust assessment

Risk level: high, estimated (decoded bytecode, low confidence).

Who controls it: A privileged key with the role controls could likely change exemption lists or reward and burn parameters and potentially redirect value flows from pools using this hook.

Risk to user funds: Because the hook returns swap deltas and moves currency through the pool manager, it can hold or redirect user swap value. The degree of exposure depends on logic that cannot be confirmed from bytecode alone.

Security findings

• [high] Return deltas can move user funds: beforeSwapReturnDelta and afterSwapReturnDelta are enabled, so the hook can change settled swap amounts and take currency from trades on pools it governs.
• [medium] Currency movement via pool manager calls: The bytecode contains take, settle, sync and modifyLiquidity selectors, so the hook can transfer or move pool currency during callbacks.
• [medium] Privileged role mappings: Storage mappings written by several admin style selectors indicate role or allowlist control over hook behaviour, which can gate or redirect swaps.
• [info] Unverified source: No verified source is available, so the exact fee, reward and burn math and any admin powers are inferred from decoded selectors only.

Contract details

Verified source

No

Bytecode size

21,280 bytes

Upgradeable proxy

No

Detected patterns

erc20, erc6909-claims, launchpad, moves-currency, return-delta, rewards, self-unlock

Pools using Launchpad hook