CellHook on Ethereum

Uniswap v4 Hook Contract 0xab7f6eaafff791c3ef699a3df271fd4d90389044 on Ethereum · Launchpad · Verified contract

Volume (24h)
$0
Value locked (TVL)
$8.47K
All-time volume
$546.46K
Pools using this hook
1
Swaps (24h)
0 (0 traders)
Total swaps
2,460

What it does

A Uniswap v4 hook that is its own ERC-20: it charges a 7% swap fee, burns the CELL-side fee and streams the ETH-side fee to holders as a live yield, while holders with large enough balances can eat smaller ones on a volume-paced schedule.

How it works step by step

  • Charges a 7% fee on both directions, taken in the unspecified currency so exact-output swaps are not exempt
  • Burns the entire CELL-side fee, deflating supply with no token reward to holders
  • Streams the ETH-side fee to live cell holders in proportion to balance above a safe floor, paid in native ETH
  • Runs volume-paced eats: a predator within 1.25x mass burns 80% of a prey's eatable balance and takes 10%, resolved a block later off a blockhash seed
  • Enforces a 1.5% max-wallet cap for 10 minutes after launch to block sniping, with exclusions for infrastructure
  • Seeds single-sided locked POL below the launch price that the hook can never withdraw
Swap behaviour
Every swap pays a 7% fee in the unspecified currency. CELL-side fees are burned; ETH-side fees are split 70% to live holders by mass and 30% to a kill bounty. Swap volume also arms eats that resolve in a later block.
Liquidity behaviour
No liquidity callbacks. Single-sided locked POL is seeded once by the launcher in a range entirely below the launch price via seed(); the position is never removed by the hook, and any extra ETH from trading accrues into it.
Fee behaviour
Swap fee of 7% (FEE_BPS 700) taken in the swap's unspecified currency on every swap, including exact-output swaps. The ETH-side fee is split 70% streamed to live cell holders by mass and 30% to a kill bounty pool. The CELL-side fee is 100% burned (FEE_BURN_BPS 10000), with zero token rewards and no LP share. The pool's own static fee is separate.
Owner & admin controls
No admin controls found: the hook has no owner, pause or upgrade path after launch. The only privileged role is the deployer, which can only call addExclusions before link() and link() once; after link the exclusion set and NFT/renderer wiring are immutable.

Enabled Uniswap v4 callbacks

afterInitialize, afterSwap, afterSwapReturnDelta

afterInitialize: gates launch to the deployer, starts the 10-minute anti-snipe cap window and computes the single-sided POL range. afterSwap: takes the 7% unspecified-currency fee, routes it to burn or ETH bloodstream, and arms volume-paced eats resolved in a later block. afterSwapReturnDelta: lets the hook take its fee as a return delta in the unspecified slot.

Security & trust assessment

Risk level: medium (verified source, high confidence).

Who controls it: Effectively none after launch. Deployer can only add exclusions and link the NFT/renderer once before freezing. No owner, pause, upgrade or parameter setter exists, so no privileged key can change fees or block swaps.

Risk to user funds: The hook holds CELL fee reserve and the ETH bloodstream (stream, bounty and escrow). Holder mass stays in wallets and is only moved or burned by eats and decay, which are capped by floors and ratio gates. Locked POL cannot be removed by the hook, so no admin can pull liquidity or block swaps.

Security findings

  • [medium] Hook custodies fee and ETH reserves: The hook takes a 7% fee on both ETH and CELL sides via afterSwapReturnDelta and holds ETH and CELL fees; a bug in the accounting or the eat/bounty logic could affect those reserves, though invariants are asserted in code.
  • [medium] Eat selection is partially manipulable: Eat outcomes are seeded from a blockhash and prevrandao, which validators can partially influence; the design mitigates this with a commit lag and stale-commit guard, but a patient actor on a sparse board can still bias outcomes.
  • [low] Launch-time concentration controls: Launch anti-snipe caps non-excluded wallets at 1.5% of supply for 10 minutes, and the deployer gating blocks hostile first initialization. The launcher holds the initial supply and exclusions are fixed at link.
  • [info] ETH egress is pull-safe: Holder ETH is pushed with a 30k gas cap and failed sends are escrowed for pull claims, with a reentrancy guard on egress paths, so a rejecting recipient cannot brick transfers.

Contract details

Verified source
Yes (CellHook)
Compiler
solc 0.8.26+commit.8a97fa7a
Bytecode size
23,319 bytes
Upgradeable proxy
No
Detected patterns
erc20, launchpad, moves-currency, return-delta, self-unlock

Pools using CellHook