Hook 0xb6fe…c0cc on Ethereum

Uniswap v4 Hook Contract 0xb6fe0ba9430d86339242e8ff00af1dc3e2bcc0cc on Ethereum · Other

Volume (24h)
$13.68K
Value locked (TVL)
$7.19K
All-time volume
$13.68K
Pools using this hook
1
Swaps (24h)
115 (40 traders)
Total swaps
115

What it does

An unverified hook with swap-time return-delta permissions that appears to run a token launch or incentive mechanism around the pool, with access-controlled configuration.

How it works step by step

  • Runs logic in beforeSwap and afterSwap that updates internal counters and flags
  • Uses beforeSwapReturnDelta and afterSwapReturnDelta to take or give currency during swaps
  • Calls back into the pool manager via unlock and settle flows
  • Exposes launch, setup and pool-creation functions for configuring pools
  • Supports token mint, burn and staking or claim style functions
Swap behaviour
beforeSwap and afterSwap run and can return deltas that take or give currency, so swaps may be fee-skimmed or adjusted; the exact logic cannot be confirmed from bytecode.
Liquidity behaviour
Has beforeAddLiquidity, afterAddLiquidity, beforeRemoveLiquidity and afterRemoveLiquidity view selectors, but these are not in the enabled permissions list, so the hook does not act on liquidity callbacks; the wider function set (launch, supply, stake, claim, deposit, fund, mint, burn) suggests a token/launchpad style system around the pool.
Fee behaviour
Cannot be determined from the decoded functions; the hook has beforeSwap and afterSwap with return deltas, so it may alter fees or take a portion of swap amounts, but no clear fee-setting logic was decoded.
Owner & admin controls
Storage slots 0x07, 0x08, 0x0a, 0x0d and 0x0e are read by a modifier-style check and written by owner-like selectors (0x22d2f2b2, 0x271a00bc, 0x73ffb20a, 0xa45dc452, 0xa9345473, 0xb5b666ae, 0xbe5d69db, 0x52f8e086), indicating an access-controlled allowlist/role system and a pause-like boolean, but the exact owner and who holds these roles cannot be determined from bytecode alone.

Enabled Uniswap v4 callbacks

beforeSwap, afterSwap, beforeSwapReturnDelta, afterSwapReturnDelta

beforeSwap: decoded selector 0x575e24b4 reads and writes global counters and flags before a swap. afterSwap: decoded selector 0xb47b2fb1 updates the counter in slot 6 after a swap. beforeSwapReturnDelta and afterSwapReturnDelta: enable the hook to return deltas that can take or give currency during swaps, which is the mechanism for moving user or pool funds.

Security & trust assessment

Risk level: high (decoded bytecode, low confidence).

Who controls it: Privileged roles appear to control launch and pool setup, role mappings, and a boolean pause-like flag; a compromised privileged key could likely reconfigure allowlists, toggle behaviour, or direct currency taken via return deltas.

Risk to user funds: The hook can take and settle currency via return deltas during swaps and can mint and burn tokens, so user and pool funds could be moved or diverted; the exact conditions and amounts are not determinable from the decoded input.

Security findings

  • [high] Hook takes currency through return deltas: beforeSwapReturnDelta and afterSwapReturnDelta are enabled, and the bytecode contains take, settle and sync calls plus moves-currency and self-unlock tags, so the hook can take or give tokens during swaps.
  • [medium] Privileged role mappings can alter behaviour: Several selectors write to slots holding booleans and address mappings (0x22d2f2b2, 0x271a00bc, 0x73ffb20a, 0xa45dc452, 0xa9345473, 0xb5b666ae, 0xbe5d69db, 0x52f8e086), consistent with a privileged admin that can grant roles and toggle behaviour.
  • [medium] Self-unlock callback flow: Selectors 0x91dd7346 and 0xa69df4b5 with the unlock and unlockCallback flow indicate the hook calls back into the pool manager to unlock and settle, which expands the code path that can move funds.
  • [info] Burn mechanics present: Burn-related selectors and a totalBurned view indicate tokens are burned as part of the mechanism, which may be irreversible for users.
  • [info] Unverified source: The source is unverified and the function names are mostly unknown, so the true behaviour and the presence of hidden admin paths cannot be fully confirmed.

Contract details

Verified source
No
Bytecode size
21,489 bytes
Upgradeable proxy
No
Detected patterns
erc6909-claims, moves-currency, return-delta, self-unlock

Pools using Hook 0xb6fe…c0cc