Launchpad hook on Ethereum

Uniswap v4 Hook Contract 0xd7aef0032b7bec98ba5312351fa40d7d6bd4a0cc on Ethereum · Launchpad

Volume (24h)
$2.33
Value locked (TVL)
$2.38
All-time volume
$2.33
Pools using this hook
1
Swaps (24h)
2 (1 traders)
Total swaps
2

What it does

A launchpad hook that protects new token launches from snipers with a time-decaying fee and distributes collected fees to protocol treasury, creators and rewards.

How it works step by step

  • Registers new pools in beforeInitialize and stores per-pool launch parameters
  • Charges a time-decaying snipe fee on early swaps through beforeSwap return deltas
  • Accumulates protocol and creator shares in protocolOwed and creatorClaimable mappings
  • Tracks rewards per address and lets the treasury sweep accrued balances
  • Gates liquidity operations and whitelists launcher addresses via isLauncher/setLauncher
Swap behaviour
beforeSwap and afterSwap apply a snipe fee that decays over time and split collected amounts via return deltas to treasury and creator accounts; the hook may revert swaps flagged as sandwiches.
Liquidity behaviour
beforeAddLiquidity, afterAddLiquidity, beforeRemoveLiquidity and afterRemoveLiquidity are exposed, suggesting liquidity is gated or tracked (for example for rewards accounting and circulating supply), but the bodies were not verified.
Fee behaviour
Hook takes a launch-time sniping fee (currentSnipeBps decays over time per pool) plus protocol and creator shares tracked in protocolOwed and creatorClaimable mappings; fees are taken via return deltas and distributed to treasury, creator and rewards sink.
Owner & admin controls
Owner (slot 0) can call setOwner, setLauncher (whitelists launcher addresses), setTreasury, and setCreator for pools; creators can claimCreator. A treasury address receives protocol-owed fees and can sweep them via sweep(address).

Enabled Uniswap v4 callbacks

beforeInitialize, beforeSwap, afterSwap, beforeSwapReturnDelta, afterSwapReturnDelta

beforeInitialize registers pools; beforeSwap and afterSwap apply sniping protection and fee accounting; beforeSwapReturnDelta and afterSwapReturnDelta let the hook take a share of swap amounts; afterSwap also updates rewards and balances.

Security & trust assessment

Risk level: medium (decoded bytecode, medium confidence).

Who controls it: The owner and whitelisted launchers control pool registration and treasury/creator routing; the owner can reassign treasury and creator addresses, redirecting fee flows.

Risk to user funds: The hook holds ERC20 balances for protocol, creator and rewards accounting and takes tokens via return deltas on swaps, so user swap proceeds are partly exposed to hook fee logic and sweep.

Security findings

  • [medium] Swap-level fee extraction via return deltas: Hook uses beforeSwapReturnDelta and afterSwapReturnDelta, so it can skim tokens from every swap on registered pools.
  • [medium] Owner can redirect fee recipients: setTreasury and setCreator are owner-controlled; changing them redirects accrued protocol and creator fees to new addresses.
  • [low] Swaps can be blocked during launch protection: A SandwichBlocked error and sniping-bps logic can revert or block swaps during the launch window.
  • [info] Sweep function moves held balances: sweep(address) can move balances the hook holds for protocol and users, and the implementation was not verified.

Contract details

Verified source
No
Bytecode size
17,851 bytes
Upgradeable proxy
No
Detected patterns
erc20, moves-currency, return-delta, self-unlock

Pools using Launchpad hook