Dynamic fee hook on Polygon

Uniswap v4 Hook Contract 0x6fe37401ad63463e1cc1ba09704aa2865ce3c000 on Polygon · Dynamic fee

Volume (24h)
$0.10
Value locked (TVL)
$10.00
All-time volume
$641.93K
Pools using this hook
1
Swaps (24h)
1 (1 traders)
Total swaps
9,785

What it does

A Uniswap v4 hook on Polygon that appears to manage a dynamic LP fee for a pool, with owner-controlled fee settings and a designated rebalancer role.

How it works step by step

  • Exposes publicFee and ZERO_FEE, indicating a configurable dynamic fee
  • Calls updateDynamicLPFee on the pool manager to set the LP fee
  • Lets the owner set per-pool fees via setPoolFee
  • Designates a rebalancer address that has its own privileged functions
  • Has several nonpayable entrypoints taking token addresses and amounts, likely for rebalancing or swap routing
Swap behaviour
Swap-related entrypoints exist (functions taking pool key, amounts and a fee uint24), but the exact beforeSwap/afterSwap behaviour cannot be confirmed without source.
Liquidity behaviour
No clear liquidity callbacks decoded; the nonpayable functions with address, uint256 x3, address and bytes/bool/uint24 arguments may relate to rebalancing or swap-related routing rather than liquidity add/remove.
Fee behaviour
Fees are set dynamically: the hook exposes publicFee and a per-pool fee setter (setPoolFee) and calls updateDynamicLPFee on the pool manager, indicating a dynamic LP fee managed by the hook; a ZERO_FEE constant also exists, suggesting fee can be zeroed for certain flows.
Owner & admin controls
Owner (slot 0) can transfer ownership and set the rebalancer address (setRebalancer) and set pool fees via setPoolFee; the owner-gated functions are inferred from storage reads/writes rather than source.

Security & trust assessment

Risk level: medium, estimated (decoded bytecode, medium confidence).

Who controls it: The owner can reassign the rebalancer, transfer ownership and set per-pool fees, so a compromised owner key could change fees on pools using this hook and redirect rebalancing authority.

Risk to user funds: Unclear from bytecode alone; the multiple nonpayable swap-like entrypoints taking token addresses and amounts suggest the hook may handle or route tokens, so exposure cannot be ruled out.

Security findings

  • [medium] Owner can change fees and rebalancer: Owner-controlled setPoolFee and setRebalancer allow the privileged key to change fee parameters and the rebalancer role without any visible timelock in the decoded code.
  • [medium] Unverified fund-moving entrypoints: Several nonpayable functions take an address and three uint256 values plus a token address, which may move or route funds; without source it cannot be confirmed whether these interact with user or pool balances.
  • [info] Unverified source: No source is verified, so function semantics, access checks and any upgrade mechanism cannot be fully confirmed from bytecode alone.

Contract details

Verified source
No
Bytecode size
5,686 bytes
Upgradeable proxy
No
Detected patterns
dynamic-fee, ownable

Pools using Dynamic fee hook