Fee sharing hook on Arbitrum

Uniswap v4 Hook Contract 0x00408c8f0bc467d991996aea9e18a966d6a54040 on Arbitrum · Fee sharing

Volume (24h)
$0
Value locked (TVL)
$0.24
All-time volume
$0
Pools using this hook
1
Swaps (24h)
0 (0 traders)
Total swaps
0

What it does

A small Uniswap v4 hook that runs custom logic after swaps, likely directing a share of swap value to a fee recipient, but its exact behaviour cannot be confirmed without verified source.

How it works step by step

  • Runs custom logic in afterSwap, the only enabled callback
  • Exposes a feeRecipient() getter, suggesting value is directed to a fixed address
  • Implements add, remove and donate liquidity callbacks that appear to be pass-through or placeholder
  • Exposes poolManager() and VERSION() getters for integration and identification
Swap behaviour
Runs afterSwap logic after each swap; likely takes a fee or share to feeRecipient, exact amounts unconfirmed.
Liquidity behaviour
Exposes before and after callbacks for add, remove and donate liquidity; the implementation logic cannot be determined from selectors alone.
Fee behaviour
Fees are not set by the hook from the decoded selectors; a feeRecipient() getter exists, suggesting the hook may route a portion of pool value to a recipient in afterSwap, but the mechanism cannot be confirmed without source.
Owner & admin controls
No admin controls found in decoded functions; only view getters (feeRecipient, poolManager, VERSION) are exposed, with no owner, setter or pause selectors detected.

Enabled Uniswap v4 callbacks

afterSwap

afterSwap is the only enabled permission, used to run custom logic after each swap completes; the hook likely uses it to account for or collect a fee to feeRecipient.

Security & trust assessment

Risk level: medium, estimated (decoded bytecode, low confidence).

Who controls it: Cannot be fully assessed. The feeRecipient address is a single configured destination; if it is set through an unseen mutable path, the holder could redirect fee value.

Risk to user funds: The hook runs after swaps and may take a portion of swap proceeds to feeRecipient; the exact amount and whether it can be changed cannot be determined from the bytecode provided.

Security findings

  • [info] Unverified source: No source is verified, so the afterSwap logic, any fee-taking amounts and any mutable recipient address cannot be inspected directly.
  • [medium] Possible value extraction from swaps: The hook implements afterSwap and reads feeRecipient, which suggests it may take value from swap outputs and send it to a fixed recipient.
  • [low] No visible admin setter: Only view getters are visible; no setter for feeRecipient was detected among dispatched selectors, which reduces but does not eliminate centralization risk.

Contract details

Verified source
No
Bytecode size
1,550 bytes
Upgradeable proxy
No
Detected patterns
fee-sharing

Pools using Fee sharing hook