Liquidity management hook on Avalanche

Uniswap v4 Hook Contract 0x08fe7f7440e59878d1cc6c56ffa523206c594a00 on Avalanche · Liquidity management

Volume (24h)
$0
Value locked (TVL)
$12
All-time volume
$1.51K
Pools using this hook
2
Swaps (24h)
0 (0 traders)
Total swaps
30

What it does

A Uniswap v4 hook that runs checks or logic before liquidity is added to or removed from its pool, with no swap or fee changes apparent.

How it works step by step

  • Runs a callback before liquidity is added to a pool (beforeAddLiquidity)
  • Runs a callback before liquidity is removed from a pool (beforeRemoveLiquidity)
  • Exposes poolManager and getHookPermissions view functions
  • Does not enable swap, donate, or initialize callbacks based on the address permissions
Swap behaviour
No swap callbacks.
Liquidity behaviour
beforeAddLiquidity and beforeRemoveLiquidity are dispatched and afterAddLiquidity and afterRemoveLiquidity are also present, so the hook can inspect or gate liquidity changes; the exact logic is not recoverable from the decoded selectors alone.
Fee behaviour
Uses the pool's static fee.
Owner & admin controls
No admin controls found.

Enabled Uniswap v4 callbacks

beforeAddLiquidity, beforeRemoveLiquidity

beforeAddLiquidity: runs before liquidity is added and can inspect or reject the position; beforeRemoveLiquidity: runs before liquidity is removed and can inspect or reject the removal; the remaining dispatched callbacks (swap, donate, initialize, after-liquidity) appear to be interface stubs that are not enabled by the address permissions.

Security & trust assessment

Risk level: medium, estimated (decoded bytecode, low confidence).

Who controls it: No owner or privileged role was identified in the decoded bytecode, and no storage layout was inferred, so a privileged key could not be confirmed.

Risk to user funds: Based on the enabled permissions, the hook sits in the add and remove liquidity path and could in principle block those operations, but it does not appear to take or hold tokens; this cannot be fully confirmed without source.

Security findings

  • [info] Unimplemented callbacks revert: The bytecode contains a HookNotImplemented error selector, which suggests unimplemented callbacks revert by design and are not a hidden backdoor.
  • [info] No storage detected: The inferred storage layout is empty, so no mutable state, owner, or pause flag was detected in the decoded data.
  • [medium] Liquidity logic unverified: Without verified source, the full logic of the liquidity callbacks cannot be confirmed, so any hidden restriction on adding or removing liquidity cannot be ruled out.

Contract details

Verified source
No
Bytecode size
1,983 bytes
Upgradeable proxy
No

Pools using Liquidity management hook