Likely custom pricing hook on Robinhood Chain

Uniswap v4 Hook Contract 0x027cbf91e9767ff1530beea687ebf700f51d0088 on Robinhood Chain · Custom pricing

Volume (24h)
$0
Value locked (TVL)
$0
All-time volume
$0
Pools using this hook
1
Swaps (24h)
0 (0 traders)
Total swaps
0

What it does

This hook runs custom logic before each swap that can alter the settled amounts and move currency out of the pool, but without verified source the exact effect on which trades pay more or less cannot be determined.

How it works step by step

  • Implements only beforeSwap and returns a before-swap delta, so it can alter the amounts settled for a swap
  • Calls take(address,address,uint256) on the PoolManager, which moves currency out of the pool to the hook
  • Keeps per-address accounting in a mapping at storage slot 2 that is written during swaps
  • Exposes a view function selected by 0xf8c54173 that reads slots 0, 1 and 2, likely a status or balance query
  • Uses a Panic(uint256) revert path, which indicates arithmetic checks such as overflow or underflow guards
Swap behaviour
On each swap the beforeSwap callback runs, updates the address-keyed mapping, may take currency from the pool through the PoolManager, and returns a delta that changes the swap amounts; the exact fee or pricing rule cannot be determined from the bytecode alone.
Liquidity behaviour
No liquidity callbacks.
Fee behaviour
Cannot be determined from decoded bytecode; the delta returned from beforeSwap may act as a custom fee or rebate, but the pool's own fee is not confirmed to be overridden.
Owner & admin controls
No admin controls found.

Enabled Uniswap v4 callbacks

beforeSwap, beforeSwapReturnDelta

beforeSwap is used to run custom logic and set the swap delta before the pool executes the trade; beforeSwapReturnDelta lets that delta alter the amounts the pool settles.

Security & trust assessment

Risk level: medium, estimated (decoded bytecode, low confidence).

Who controls it: No owner or admin functions were identified, so no privileged key was found; the hook's behaviour is fixed at deployment.

Risk to user funds: The hook can take currency from the pool via take and alter swap deltas, so pool and trader funds are exposed to whatever logic governs those transfers, which cannot be fully verified from bytecode.

Security findings

  • [medium] Return delta can alter swap settlement: beforeSwapReturnDelta is enabled and the hook calls take on the PoolManager, so it can change how much currency a swap moves and remove tokens from pool reserves.
  • [medium] No source verification: Without verified source the exact pricing, fee and withdrawal logic cannot be audited, so the true behaviour may differ from what the bytecode suggests.
  • [low] Address-keyed accounting state: A mapping in storage slot 2 is written in beforeSwap, so user-specific balances or limits are tracked on chain and could be manipulated if the update logic is flawed.
  • [info] Arithmetic panic path present: The Panic(uint256) selector appears in the bytecode, indicating checked arithmetic that reverts on overflow or underflow.

Contract details

Verified source
No
Bytecode size
1,182 bytes
Upgradeable proxy
No
Detected patterns
moves-currency, return-delta

Pools using Likely custom pricing hook