Likely fee sharing hook on Robinhood Chain

Uniswap v4 Hook Contract 0x063b4b73db79eb83ac15c6f120f8c5990310e054 on Robinhood Chain · Fee sharing

Volume (24h)
$0
Value locked (TVL)
<$0.01
All-time volume
$0
Pools using this hook
1
Swaps (24h)
0 (0 traders)
Total swaps
0

What it does

Takes a fee on swaps in pools using this hook and splits it between protocol, pool creator, dev and a burn sink.

How it works step by step

  • Validates and registers pools in beforeInitialize, recording the creator per pool.
  • Takes a hook fee from swaps in afterSwap using afterSwapReturnDelta.
  • Splits accrued fees into protocol, creator, dev and burn shares using fixed share constants.
  • Tracks per-currency protocolFees and transfers them out through the pool manager.
  • Accounts donations in afterDonate for round-based distribution (roundDuration, mapping of rounds).
Swap behaviour
afterSwap computes a hook fee on the swap, takes it through the pool manager via return delta, and accrues it to protocol, creator, dev and burn shares.
Liquidity behaviour
No liquidity callbacks.
Fee behaviour
afterSwap accounts a hook fee that is split between protocol, creator, dev and burn shares (PROTOCOL_SHARE, CREATOR_SHARE, DEV_SHARE, BURN_SINK, SHARE_DENOMINATOR, FEE_DENOMINATOR), with protocolFees tracked per currency and taken via the pool manager. Exact split logic is inferred from selector names only.
Owner & admin controls
Owner (Ownable, transferOwnership) can call setBurnToken(address) to configure the burn token; owner-gated setters appear present. A 'authorizedInitializer' and 'authorized' getter exist. Owner also appears able to change burnToken, which controls where collected fees are routed. No pause or upgrade mechanism identified.

Enabled Uniswap v4 callbacks

beforeInitialize, afterSwap, afterDonate, afterSwapReturnDelta

beforeInitialize registers pools and validates the pool hook; afterSwap computes and settles fee shares using afterSwapReturnDelta; afterDonate records donation-related accounting.

Security & trust assessment

Risk level: medium, estimated (decoded bytecode, medium confidence).

Who controls it: The owner can change the burn token and routing configuration, which affects where accrued fee shares go. Pool-creator and initializer authorization lists are controlled by privileged roles.

Risk to user funds: The hook can take a fee from swap outputs via afterSwapReturnDelta and transfer tokens out through the pool manager. It does not appear to block swaps, but fee destinations are changeable by the owner.

Security findings

  • [medium] Hook takes swap value via return delta: afterSwapReturnDelta lets the hook take a portion of swap output, so the hook directly moves user-trade value into fee accounting.
  • [medium] Owner can redirect fee destination: setBurnToken is owner-gated and changes where fee shares are sent, so a compromised owner could redirect accrued fees.
  • [low] Single privileged owner key: Ownable single-key control with no visible timelock or pause in the decoded selectors.

Contract details

Verified source
No
Bytecode size
9,564 bytes
Upgradeable proxy
No
Detected patterns
moves-currency, ownable, return-delta

Pools using Likely fee sharing hook