Likely custom pricing hook on Robinhood Chain

Uniswap v4 Hook Contract 0x0ae1d96186e09fd417a32e23421424da7ebc8088 on Robinhood Chain · Custom pricing

Volume (24h)
$0
Value locked (TVL)
$0
All-time volume
$0
Pools using this hook
1
Swaps (24h)
0 (0 traders)
Total swaps
0

What it does

This hook runs custom accounting before each swap by returning a delta that can change the amounts settled, but without source its exact effect on which trades pay more or less cannot be determined.

How it works step by step

  • Exposes a beforeSwap callback that receives the swap params and can return a delta, letting the hook take over part of the swap accounting
  • Reads and writes three storage slots, including a mapping(address => uint256) keyed by address, during swaps
  • Exposes a 0x22d18833 view function returning an address, likely a stored configuration or owner reference
  • Has no liquidity callbacks and no afterSwap logic, so its effect is limited to the before-swap return delta path
Swap behaviour
beforeSwap is called with the sender, pool key, swap params and hook data; it updates storage slots 0, 1 and a per-address mapping in slot 2, and can return a delta that alters the amounts settled for the swap.
Liquidity behaviour
No liquidity callbacks.
Fee behaviour
Uses the pool's static fee; no dynamic fee override is decoded, though the return delta can change effective amounts.
Owner & admin controls
No admin controls found in the decoded selectors; the view function 0x22d18833 returns an address that may be an owner or config reference, but its role cannot be confirmed without source.

Enabled Uniswap v4 callbacks

beforeSwap, beforeSwapReturnDelta

beforeSwap is enabled to run logic before each swap, and beforeSwapReturnDelta is enabled so the hook can return a delta that changes the swap's settled amounts.

Security & trust assessment

Risk level: high, estimated (decoded bytecode, low confidence).

Who controls it: Cannot be determined without source; if the returned address is an owner with write access to the storage slots, that key could influence swap deltas for all users.

Risk to user funds: The hook can alter swap amounts via the before-swap return delta, so it can affect how much users pay or receive, though it does not appear to hold a custody balance from the decoded functions.

Security findings

  • [high] Return delta can alter swap settlement: beforeSwapReturnDelta is enabled, so the hook can return a delta that changes amounts taken from or paid to the swapper and the pool, which can shift value between users and LPs.
  • [medium] Unverified source: No verified source is available, so the logic of the storage writes in beforeSwap and the per-address mapping cannot be confirmed to be safe.
  • [info] Per-address state written during swaps: The mapping in slot 2 is written in beforeSwap and keyed by address, which suggests per-user accounting or gating on each swap.
  • [info] Possible privileged address exposed: The view function 0x22d18833 returns an address, which may identify an owner or controller whose powers cannot be determined from bytecode alone.

Contract details

Verified source
No
Bytecode size
1,670 bytes
Upgradeable proxy
No
Detected patterns
return-delta

Pools using Likely custom pricing hook