Likely fee sharing hook on Robinhood Chain

Uniswap v4 Hook Contract 0x0af0fe03f84c334bf9798a9d972bab5172e98044 on Robinhood Chain · Fee sharing

Volume (24h)
$991
Value locked (TVL)
$309
All-time volume
$1.69K
Pools using this hook
4
Swaps (24h)
212 (74 traders)
Total swaps
540

What it does

A Uniswap v4 hook that skims part of each swap's output into a claimable balance for the depositor-facing claim flow, with liquidity callbacks left as no-op stubs.

How it works step by step

  • Enables afterSwap and afterSwapReturnDelta permissions
  • Takes a portion of swap output from the pool manager via take and mint calls
  • Records accrued amounts as ERC-6909 claim balances per address
  • Lets users query claimable(address) and redeem with claim(address,uint256)
  • Uses unlockCallback to perform settlement through a self-unlock pattern
  • Liquidity and donate callbacks are present but appear to do nothing
Swap behaviour
afterSwap runs after each swap and, through afterSwapReturnDelta, can take a share of the output which is credited as ERC-6909 claims for later redemption.
Liquidity behaviour
beforeAddLiquidity, afterAddLiquidity, beforeRemoveLiquidity, afterRemoveLiquidity and donate hooks exist as view stubs; they appear to be non-operative pass-throughs.
Fee behaviour
No fee logic was decoded; the hook does not appear to override fees, so the pool's static fee applies.
Owner & admin controls
No admin controls found. poolOwner() is exposed as a view getter but no setter or pause function was decoded.

Enabled Uniswap v4 callbacks

afterSwap, afterSwapReturnDelta

afterSwap is used to run custom logic after each swap; afterSwapReturnDelta lets the hook take a share of the swap output as a delta, which the pool manager accounts for via mint/burn and take calls.

Security & trust assessment

Risk level: medium, estimated (decoded bytecode, low confidence).

Who controls it: No privileged role was identified from the decoded selectors, so no single key was found that could alter user settlement directly.

Risk to user funds: The hook can take a portion of swap output via return deltas and custody it as ERC-6909 claims that users must later claim, so funds routed through this pool are partially held by the hook until claimed.

Security findings

  • [medium] Hook takes a share of swap output: afterSwapReturnDelta is enabled and the bytecode contains take, mint and burn calls, so the hook can withhold part of swap output and hold it as ERC-6909 claims.
  • [low] Self-unlock claim flow: unlockCallback and claim functions are present along with a storage slot read and written in claim flow, and selectors ClaimInProgress and NoActiveClaim indicate a self-unlock pattern for settling claims.
  • [info] Claim mechanism not fully verified: The bytecode exposes claimable(address) and claim(address,uint256) allowing users to redeem accrued ERC-6909 balances; the logic was not fully decoded, so correctness of accounting could not be verified.

Contract details

Verified source
No
Bytecode size
5,177 bytes
Upgradeable proxy
No
Detected patterns
erc6909-claims, moves-currency, return-delta, self-unlock

Pools using Likely fee sharing hook