Utility hook on Robinhood Chain

Uniswap v4 Hook Contract 0x0b23cde6c15d8751624b1ae915df2587fe6c1000 on Robinhood Chain · Utility

Volume (24h)
$0
Value locked (TVL)
$0
All-time volume
$6.82M
Pools using this hook
1
Swaps (24h)
0 (0 traders)
Total swaps
12,019

What it does

A no-op hook that exists only so a pool carries a hook, which the protocol fee controller currently uses as a signal to leave that pool's protocol fee at zero.

How it works step by step

  • Implements only afterInitialize, which the PoolManager calls once when a pool using this hook is created.
  • afterInitialize returns its own selector, satisfying the PoolManager's required return value and doing nothing else.
  • Its deployment address is mined so the low 14 bits equal 0x1000, meaning only the afterInitialize permission is set.
  • Because no other permission bits are set, swap, liquidity and delta hooks never execute, so there is no per-trade gas cost.
  • isValidHookAddress lets anyone check on-chain that an address carries exactly the afterInitialize flag.
Swap behaviour
No swap callbacks.
Liquidity behaviour
No liquidity callbacks.
Fee behaviour
Uses the pool's static fee. The hook does not set, take or share fees; its stated purpose is that pools with any hook attached are skipped by the protocol fee controller, which leaves protocol fee at zero.
Owner & admin controls
No admin controls found.

Enabled Uniswap v4 callbacks

afterInitialize

afterInitialize only: runs once when a pool using this hook is created, and returns its own selector to satisfy the PoolManager's return check.

Security & trust assessment

Risk level: low (verified source, high confidence).

Who controls it: No privileged role exists in the contract, so no key can change its behaviour. The only external dependency is the protocol fee controller, which is outside this contract and could start including hooked pools at any time.

Risk to user funds: None. The contract holds no tokens or ETH, does not transfer funds, and cannot block swaps or liquidity actions because it is never called on those paths.

Security findings

  • [info] Permissions limited to afterInitialize by address: The hook address encodes only the afterInitialize permission bit (0x1000 within the low 14 bits), so the PoolManager will never call swap, liquidity or delta-returning callbacks on this contract.
  • [info] No access control on afterInitialize: afterInitialize has no onlyPoolManager check and is pure, so any caller can invoke it harmlessly; it writes no storage and moves no funds.
  • [low] Benefit depends on external fee controller behaviour: The contract's usefulness depends on the protocol fee controller continuing to skip hooked pools, which the source itself describes as current behaviour rather than protocol rule. If that changes, the hook provides no benefit.

Contract details

Verified source
No
Bytecode size
341 bytes
Upgradeable proxy
No

Pools using Utility hook