MEV protection hook on Robinhood Chain

Uniswap v4 Hook Contract 0x177a0e4de47190417c6d7ae8769b3b7cac5d40c0 on Robinhood Chain · MEV protection

Volume (24h)
$0
Value locked (TVL)
$0
All-time volume
$0
Pools using this hook
1
Swaps (24h)
0 (0 traders)
Total swaps
0

What it does

This hook protects a token launch by rejecting swaps that snipe early, exceed wallet caps or ignore cooldowns, while admin-allowlisted addresses are exempt, all trades pay the pool's normal fee, and LPs can withdraw freely.

This read was written for the hook 0x5d74…80c0 on Robinhood Chain and reused here: the two share a code shape, so constants such as fees, owners and addresses can differ.

How it works step by step

  • Adds launch-period trading protections to a token pool: anti-sniping, per-wallet holding caps and swap cooldowns.
  • Keeps an allowlist of addresses that an admin can exempt from these restrictions.
  • Records the last swap time per trader to enforce cooldowns.
  • Calls the PoolManager's take function, which suggests it may collect a fee to a fee recipient, though without return-delta permissions it cannot deduct from swap amounts.
Swap behaviour
Before a swap, the hook can revert trades that break anti-snipe rules near the launch block, exceed a wallet cap based on token supply, or come too soon after a trader's previous swap. Allowlisted addresses appear to bypass these checks; exact durations and caps are stored in a fixed config and could not be read from bytecode.
Liquidity behaviour
No liquidity callbacks are enabled; LPs can add and withdraw freely.
Fee behaviour
Uses the pool's static fee; the hook cannot take tokens from swaps through return deltas, though a fee recipient is configured and the exact use of take is unclear from bytecode.
Owner & admin controls
A privileged caller can add or remove addresses from the allowlist, exempting them from trading restrictions. The restriction config appears to be fixed with no setter found.

Enabled Uniswap v4 callbacks

beforeSwap, afterSwap

beforeSwap: enforces anti-snipe, wallet cap, cooldown and allowlist checks; afterSwap: post-swap checks or bookkeeping such as wallet balance caps.

Security & trust assessment

Risk level: medium, estimated (decoded bytecode, medium confidence).

Who controls it: An admin controls the allowlist, so chosen addresses can trade without caps or cooldowns while others are restricted. No ability to change fees or seize funds was found.

Risk to user funds: The hook cannot deduct from swaps or LP positions through return deltas, and LP principal cannot be locked. The worst case is traders' swaps being rejected by restriction rules.

Security findings

  • [medium] Trading restrictions can block swaps: Swaps can revert under anti-snipe, wallet cap, or cooldown rules, and the admin decides who is exempt via the allowlist. Exact parameters are unverified.
  • [info] LP withdrawals unrestricted: Remove-liquidity callbacks and return deltas are disabled, so LPs can always withdraw and swap amounts cannot be deducted by the hook.

Contract details

Verified source
No
Bytecode size
4,700 bytes
Upgradeable proxy
No
Detected patterns
erc20, fee-sharing, moves-currency

Pools using MEV protection hook