Launchpad hook on Robinhood Chain

Uniswap v4 Hook Contract 0x1ae0c3e07e12ea7817e1a0ba2cab79195bd4ffcc on Robinhood Chain · Launchpad

Volume (24h)
$2.18
Value locked (TVL)
$1.70
All-time volume
$2.18
Pools using this hook
1
Swaps (24h)
5 (1 traders)
Total swaps
5

What it does

This is a launch-phase pool hook that controls swaps and liquidity within a fixed tick range and can move currency during trades, but without verified source it cannot be confirmed which trades pay more or less.

How it works step by step

  • Hook is deployed with all 10 callbacks enabled and both beforeSwapReturnDelta and afterSwapReturnDelta, so it can take over swap accounting and move currency on swaps
  • Exposes launch-related state: LAUNCH_TICK_LOWER, LAUNCH_TICK_UPPER, phase, minting, matterToken, quoteToken, and a market(bytes32) lookup, indicating a token launch pool with distinct phases
  • Calls out to a fee collector and a position manager, and uses take(address,address,uint256) on the pool manager to pull or send currency
  • Stores per-pool market data keyed by pool id in storage slot 0, and a second address mapping in slot 1 read during afterSwap
  • Dispatches liquidity and donate callbacks (beforeDonate, afterDonate) in addition to the standard add and remove liquidity hooks
  • Reverts with custom errors ZeroAddress, InvalidCurrency and InvalidHookAddress during setup or validation
Swap behaviour
beforeSwap and afterSwap are both active and the hook has return-delta permissions, so it can alter the amounts exchanged during a swap and move currency through the pool manager. The exact fee or price rule per phase cannot be determined from decoded bytecode without source, so which trades pay more or less is not established.
Liquidity behaviour
beforeAddLiquidity, afterAddLiquidity, beforeRemoveLiquidity and afterRemoveLiquidity are all implemented; liquidity is restricted to the launch tick range (LAUNCH_TICK_LOWER to LAUNCH_TICK_UPPER) according to the selectors present, but the exact gating logic is not verified.
Fee behaviour
Fee handling is not determinable from decoded bytecode; the presence of a fee collector and return-delta permissions suggests the hook may take or route fees, but the rate and recipients are unverified.
Owner & admin controls
No owner or pausing selector was identified in the decoded functions, but phase and minting state suggest an operator or minter role may advance launch phases; the exact access checks are not verified.

Enabled Uniswap v4 callbacks

beforeInitialize, afterInitialize, beforeAddLiquidity, afterAddLiquidity, beforeRemoveLiquidity, afterRemoveLiquidity, beforeSwap, afterSwap, beforeSwapReturnDelta, afterSwapReturnDelta

beforeInitialize and afterInitialize set up the launch pool; beforeAddLiquidity and afterAddLiquidity gate and track LP deposits; beforeRemoveLiquidity and afterRemoveLiquidity gate and track withdrawals; beforeSwap and afterSwap enforce phase rules and record swap effects; beforeSwapReturnDelta and afterSwapReturnDelta let the hook alter swap deltas and take currency; beforeDonate and afterDonate handle donations to the pool.

Security & trust assessment

Risk level: high, estimated (decoded bytecode, low confidence).

Who controls it: A privileged key that controls phase or minting could change launch rules, mint tokens or redirect fees, and could alter trade outcomes for holders and LPs.

Risk to user funds: The hook can hold and move currency through take and return deltas on swaps, and it gates liquidity deposits and withdrawals, so user and pool funds depend on its unverified logic.

Security findings

  • [high] Return-delta permissions with currency movement: The hook enables beforeSwapReturnDelta and afterSwapReturnDelta and calls take on the pool manager, so it can change swap amounts and move user or pool funds.
  • [medium] Phase-based state that may be admin-advanced: Storage exposes phase and minting, which typically means a privileged account can change launch rules or mint matterToken, affecting swap and liquidity outcomes.
  • [medium] Unverified source: No verified source is available, so access control on the phase, minting and fee collector paths cannot be confirmed from the bytecode alone.

Contract details

Verified source
No
Bytecode size
14,419 bytes
Upgradeable proxy
No
Detected patterns
launchpad, moves-currency, return-delta

Pools using Launchpad hook