Launchpad hook on Robinhood Chain

Volume (24h)

$0

Value locked (TVL)

$0

All-time volume

$0

Pools using this hook

1

Swaps (24h)

0 (0 traders)

Total swaps

0

What it does

This launchpad hook takes a fee from swaps in its pool and forwards it to a fee recipient, so traders pay a cut on each swap while liquidity callbacks are not used.

How it works step by step

• Launches a token paired in a Uniswap v4 pool, with the hook initialising the pool in beforeInitialize and recording its state in storage (initialised flag, sell and buy counters).
• Tracks a supply and metadata for the token it deploys (name, symbol, decimals, image, description, socials, creator and launcher getters).
• Counts buys and sells and accumulates totalFeesPaid through beforeSwap and afterSwap callbacks.
• Uses return deltas in beforeSwap and afterSwap, meaning the hook can take a share of swap amounts and move currency via the pool manager take function.
• Exposes pendingFees, feeBps and feeRecipient, indicating a fee is skimmed on swaps and forwarded to a recipient.

Swap behaviour

beforeSwap and afterSwap run on every swap; the hook updates buy and sell counters and fee totals and can take a fee from the swap via return deltas, so trades pay the hook fee (feeBps) on the swapped amount; exact split between buys and sells could not be determined from bytecode alone.

Liquidity behaviour

beforeAddLiquidity, afterAddLiquidity, beforeRemoveLiquidity and afterRemoveLiquidity selectors are present but the permissions list does not enable them, so liquidity callbacks are not expected to run; no liquidity restrictions could be confirmed.

Fee behaviour

A hook fee in basis points (feeBps) is taken on swaps via return deltas and accrued as pendingFees and totalFeesPaid, forwarded to feeRecipient; the exact fee rate and direction could not be determined from decoded bytecode.

Owner & admin controls

Access appears gated by an OnlyLauncher and OnlyPoolManager check; the launcher and creator are readable, but whether any fee or recipient parameters are changeable could not be determined from bytecode.

Enabled Uniswap v4 callbacks

beforeInitialize, beforeSwap, afterSwap, beforeSwapReturnDelta, afterSwapReturnDelta

beforeInitialize sets up pool state at pool creation; beforeSwap and afterSwap record counters and take fees; beforeSwapReturnDelta and afterSwapReturnDelta let the hook take a share of swap amounts.

Security & trust assessment

Risk level: medium, estimated (decoded bytecode, medium confidence).

Who controls it: A privileged launcher or pool manager path may be able to influence fee parameters and recipients, but this could not be confirmed from bytecode.

Risk to user funds: The hook takes a fee from swaps through return deltas, so users pay a share of trade amounts to the hook; it does not appear to hold a general custody balance.

Security findings

• [medium] Return deltas move user currency: beforeSwapReturnDelta and afterSwapReturnDelta are enabled and the bytecode calls take on the pool manager, so the hook can take a portion of every swap's tokens.
• [medium] Fee rate and recipient controls unclear: feeBps and feeRecipient are exposed, but without source it is not clear whether an owner or launcher can raise the fee or redirect it.
• [info] Unverified source: No verified source is available, so the analysis rests on decoded selectors and storage reads and may miss logic.

Contract details

Verified source

No

Bytecode size

8,680 bytes

Upgradeable proxy

No

Detected patterns

erc20, fee-sharing, launchpad, moves-currency, return-delta

Pools using Launchpad hook