Likely custom pricing hook on Robinhood Chain

Volume (24h)

$0

Value locked (TVL)

$0

All-time volume

$0

Pools using this hook

1

Swaps (24h)

5 (3 traders)

Total swaps

5

What it does

This is an upgradeable proxy hook that can intercept swaps and liquidity changes and alter swap amounts, but without its implementation source the exact fee and swap behaviour for traders and LPs cannot be determined.

How it works step by step

• Proxy contract: all calls are delegated to implementation 0x57575389433b15f4dce286953600b1675fbe354b, so actual behaviour is defined by that implementation which was not provided.
• Enables beforeInitialize, beforeAddLiquidity, beforeRemoveLiquidity, beforeSwap, afterSwap, beforeSwapReturnDelta and afterSwapReturnDelta callbacks, meaning it can intercept pool setup, liquidity changes and swaps and alter swap amounts via return deltas.
• The only dispatched selector is 0xda453e9f taking (address, bool, uint256) as a payable function, whose name is unknown from the decoded bytecode.
• Only one external call selector (Panic(uint256)) was found, indicating no clearly identified external dependencies beyond revert handling.

Swap behaviour

beforeSwap and afterSwap are enabled with return-delta permissions, so the hook can change swap amounts or take a share of swap flows; the exact logic cannot be determined without the implementation source.

Liquidity behaviour

beforeAddLiquidity and beforeRemoveLiquidity are enabled, so the hook can gate or inspect liquidity additions and removals; specific behaviour is undetermined.

Fee behaviour

Undetermined from the decoded bytecode; the hook has return-delta permissions that may affect fees or amounts, but the mechanism cannot be confirmed.

Owner & admin controls

Upgradeable proxy: the implementation can be replaced by whoever controls the proxy's upgrade authority, but no owner or admin functions were identified in the decoded selectors and the upgrade mechanism could not be confirmed.

Enabled Uniswap v4 callbacks

beforeInitialize, beforeAddLiquidity, beforeRemoveLiquidity, beforeSwap, afterSwap, beforeSwapReturnDelta, afterSwapReturnDelta

beforeInitialize: runs before pool initialization; beforeAddLiquidity and beforeRemoveLiquidity: gate or inspect liquidity changes; beforeSwap and afterSwap: run around swaps; beforeSwapReturnDelta and afterSwapReturnDelta: allow the hook to alter swap deltas, i.e. take or redirect amounts.

Security & trust assessment

Risk level: high, estimated (decoded bytecode, low confidence).

Who controls it: The proxy admin (if any) can swap the implementation and therefore change swap deltas, gate liquidity and potentially redirect funds; users depend on that key not being misused.

Risk to user funds: The hook can take or redirect swap amounts via return deltas and can gate liquidity operations, so user and pool funds are exposed to the implementation's logic and any upgrade.

Security findings

• [high] Upgradeable proxy: All calls delegate to implementation 0x5757...354b; if the proxy admin can change the implementation, the hook's swap and liquidity logic can be replaced at any time.
• [high] Return-delta permissions on swaps: beforeSwapReturnDelta and afterSwapReturnDelta are enabled, so the hook can alter swap amounts and move currency relative to the pool, which the implementation could use to extract value.
• [medium] No verified source: Implementation source is unavailable, so the actual logic, fee handling and any privileged functions cannot be audited.
• [medium] Before-liquidity gating: beforeAddLiquidity and beforeRemoveLiquidity are enabled, so the hook could block or condition LP deposits and withdrawals.

Contract details

Verified source

No

Bytecode size

24,167 bytes

Upgradeable proxy

Yes

Detected patterns

return-delta, upgradeable

Pools using Likely custom pricing hook