LaunchHook on Robinhood Chain

Uniswap v4 Hook Contract 0x2baa91b984d93626adaab071b0491d47a7b868cc on Robinhood Chain · Launchpad · Verified contract

Volume (24h)
$112
Value locked (TVL)
$11.56K
All-time volume
$2.77M
Pools using this hook
54
Swaps (24h)
3 (3 traders)
Total swaps
20,574

What it does

A single Uniswap v4 launchpad hook that charges a decaying launch fee and then a flat 1% quote-side fee on every launchpad pool, routing those fees to a splitter for creators, social claimers, referrers and the protocol.

How it works step by step

  • Forces the pool static LP fee to zero so the hook alone sets trading fees
  • Applies an exponentially decaying sniper-tax fee (90% to 3%) over the first 50 L2 blocks
  • Enforces per-wallet and per-block buy caps for the first 100 L2 blocks
  • Tracks cumulative quote inflow and graduates the pool to a permanent flat 1% fee once a threshold is crossed
  • Restricts liquidity adds to the locker until graduation, then opens the pool to public LPs
  • Mints fee claims and sends each swap's fee to FeeRouter for phase-dependent splitting
Swap behaviour
beforeSwap and afterSwap take the trading fee in WETH (quote currency) as hook deltas: 90% decaying to 3% during the first 50 L2 blocks, then 1%. During the first 100 L2 blocks buys are capped per wallet and per block. The creator's dev-buy via the locker is fee- and cap-exempt. Swap events are emitted for indexers and curve progress is tracked toward graduation.
Liquidity behaviour
Before graduation only the PermanentLocker may add liquidity (beforeAddLiquidity reverts for others); after graduation the pool is open to any LP. No remove-liquidity callbacks are enabled.
Fee behaviour
Static LP fee is required to be 0; the hook takes the full trading fee via before/after swap deltas in the quote currency (WETH). Fee is 90% decaying to 3% over the first 50 L2 blocks (launch guard), then a flat 1% on the curve and after graduation. Fees are minted as ERC-6909 claims and accrued to FeeRouter, which splits them between protocol, creator, social claimer and referrer depending on phase.
Owner & admin controls
Only the deployer can call wire once to set the factory; no owner, pause, upgrade, or fee-change functions exist on LaunchHook. FeeRouter's treasury can propose oracle signer rotation (24h timelock, applied by anyone after delay) and freeze individual social claim ids (freeze only, cannot redirect funds). Treasury address and split logic are immutable after launch config.

Enabled Uniswap v4 callbacks

beforeInitialize, beforeAddLiquidity, beforeSwap, afterSwap, beforeSwapReturnDelta, afterSwapReturnDelta

beforeInitialize restricts pool creation to the factory and requires fee 0; beforeAddLiquidity gates LP adds pre-graduation; beforeSwap enforces the phase transition and charges the fee on the specified quote side; afterSwap charges the fee on the unspecified quote side, enforces per-wallet and per-block buy caps during the cap window, records curve progress and triggers graduation; beforeSwapReturnDelta and afterSwapReturnDelta let the hook take the fee as a delta.

Security & trust assessment

Risk level: medium (verified source, high confidence).

Who controls it: The hook itself has no privileged key after wiring. FeeRouter's treasury can freeze social claim payouts for chosen claim ids and propose oracle signer changes that take effect after 24 hours; a compromised oracle signer set could authorize social claims to arbitrary wallets for accrued social fees, though not redirect other balances.

Risk to user funds: The hook holds only fee claims it mints during swaps and immediately routes to FeeRouter; it cannot move LP principal since liquidity is only gated pre-graduation. The FeeRouter holds accrued creator, referrer, social and protocol balances; these can be claimed by their owners (social via oracle attestation) and the treasury can only freeze social claims, not redirect them.

Security findings

  • [medium] Off-chain oracle governs social claim payouts: Social fee claims rely on a 2-of-3 EIP-712 oracle signer set that can be rotated by the treasury after a 24h timelock. Compromise of two signers would allow claiming accrued social-claimer balances to attacker-chosen addresses.
  • [low] Treasury freeze on social claims: Treasury can freeze any socialClaimId via setClaimFrozen, blocking that claimant's withdrawals indefinitely. Freeze does not move funds but can halt payouts.
  • [info] Anti-sniping caps are address-based: Launch-phase buy caps (1% of supply per wallet, 2% per block) are checked against tx.origin and block counters, which can be circumvented by using multiple EOAs; caps are a soft anti-sniping measure only.
  • [info] Hook holds fee claims, no admin withdrawal path: Pool fees are denominated in the quote token and captured through PoolManager claims and FeeRouter balances; the hook holds accrued ERC-6909 claims and flushes underlying to FeeRouter on demand, so user-facing swaps can only be affected by the fee schedule, not by any admin action.

Contract details

Verified source
Yes (LaunchHook)
Compiler
solc 0.8.26+commit.8a97fa7a
Bytecode size
10,046 bytes
Upgradeable proxy
No
Detected patterns
erc6909-claims, launchpad, moves-currency, return-delta, self-unlock

Pools using LaunchHook