LadderLogic on Robinhood Chain

Uniswap v4 Hook Contract 0x3bdad0b539f815ede3ff89cf511f2c37f99215c7 on Robinhood Chain · Liquidity management · Verified contract

Volume (24h)
$0
Value locked (TVL)
$0
All-time volume
$395
Pools using this hook
16
Swaps (24h)
0 (0 traders)
Total swaps
8

What it does

This hook keeps depositors' single-sided liquidity laddered around a reference price derived from a Pons curve or pool, shifting it behind the reference when swaps would hit the wrong side, and it does not charge swappers any extra fee.

How it works step by step

  • Maintains per-depositor books of single-sided ladder liquidity (token asks above the higher of pool price and reference, quote bids below the lower) across a family of pools (one per fee tier) for each token/quote pair.
  • Derives a live reference price for each token from a Pons bonding curve (reserve ratio) before graduation, or from a v4 pool price after graduation, converted to ETH via listed quote ETH pools.
  • Tracks an exponentially smoothed reference tick and a volatility estimate per token/quote pair, updated at most once per block, and uses sigma to size ranges and split liquidity across fee tiers.
  • Rebalances a book's token liquidity across its quotes and fee tiers, pulling positions home and re-placing them, rate-limited by an interval and a maximum deviation check.
  • Shields single-sided ranges that sit on the taker's side of the reference in beforeSwap by moving them behind the reference, bounded to a fixed number of books per swap.
  • Runs an autoStep after swaps that advances a cursor over due (book, token) pairs to trigger rebalances, and can swap between a book's quotes through their ETH pools to match sigma-weighted targets.
Swap behaviour
beforeSwap may move single-sided liquidity of books in the pool behind the reference (shield); afterSwap runs one bounded orchestration step that may re-lay or swap liquidity held by the hook. The hook does not set a swap fee or take a fee on swaps; the code shown contains no fee on the swap path beyond the pool's own fee tiers.
Liquidity behaviour
Adding liquidity deposits ERC-6909 claims for the book and places single-sided ranges across fee tiers; removing liquidity pulls positions back to free balance. After-liquidity callbacks run the hook's own accounting for these operations.
Fee behaviour
Fee tiers are fixed per family pool; the sigma-implied target fee only chooses which fixed tier pools receive liquidity. No dynamic fee is set and no protocol fee skim is visible in the shown logic.
Owner & admin controls
The implementation storage includes an owner, a beneficiary, a sink fee in basis points, a ponsFactory allow-list and a parameter block (tau, horizon, widths, deviation limits, intervals, slippage). The hook is behind a proxy with upgrade capability, so the implementation can be replaced. Exact setter functions are not visible in the provided library source.

Enabled Uniswap v4 callbacks

afterInitialize, afterAddLiquidity, afterRemoveLiquidity, beforeSwap, afterSwap, afterSwapReturnDelta, afterAddLiquidityReturnDelta, afterRemoveLiquidityReturnDelta

afterInitialize: registers new family pools and opens missing fee tiers at the live reference. afterAddLiquidity and afterRemoveLiquidity: book accounting for liquidity changes, with return deltas letting the hook adjust settled amounts. beforeSwap: shields ladder ranges on the taker's side of the reference. afterSwap: runs the bounded rebalancing step and may return a delta. The return-delta flags let the hook take or give currency in these callbacks.

Security & trust assessment

Risk level: high (verified source, medium confidence).

Who controls it: An owner or upgrade authority could replace the implementation, change the sink fee and beneficiary, adjust rebalance and shield parameters, and so alter where book liquidity is placed and how much of it is taken.

Risk to user funds: The hook holds depositor funds as PoolManager claims and settles them through return deltas and rebalancing swaps; a faulty or malicious upgrade or a reference manipulation could lose or misplace user value.

Security findings

  • [high] Upgradeable proxy: The hook is a proxy delegating to implementation 0x80cb4f...; the owner or upgrade authority can replace the logic and therefore the rules governing all books and pools.
  • [high] Hook holds and moves user funds via return deltas: Afters with return-delta permissions let the hook settle currency with the PoolManager, and the hook mints and burns ERC-6909 claims for each book, so the hook custodies depositor balances.
  • [medium] Reference oracle manipulation risk: Pricing relies on Pons curve reserves and on v4 pool prices, which a trader can move within a transaction; the code limits this with smoothing, a max deviation check and placement bounds, but not completely.
  • [medium] Swap-time liquidity moves: beforeSwap shield and afterSwap rebalancing move liquidity during a swap, which changes execution for takers in ways a counterparty could influence through ordering.
  • [medium] Owner-set parameters and sink: Owner can configure sinkBps, a beneficiary and the parameter block; an owner could redirect a share of value or shift ranges adversely.

Contract details

Verified source
Yes (LadderLogic)
Compiler
solc 0.8.26+commit.8a97fa7a
Bytecode size
18,619 bytes
Upgradeable proxy
Yes
Detected patterns
liquidity-management, return-delta, upgradeable

Pools using LadderLogic