Hook 0x3f34…8880 on Robinhood Chain
Uniswap v4 Hook Contract 0x3f34915d587968ca03375454786f9a8391c08880 on Robinhood Chain · Other
- Volume (24h)
- $20.34K
- Value locked (TVL)
- $0.03
- All-time volume
- $20.34K
- Pools using this hook
- 1
- Swaps (24h)
- 285 (23 traders)
- Total swaps
- 285
What it does
An upgradeable hook that runs logic before liquidity is added and before each swap, with the exact behaviour unverifiable because the source is not available.
How it works step by step
- Runs custom logic in beforeAddLiquidity before liquidity is added to a pool
- Runs custom logic in beforeSwap before each swap executes
- Delegates all calls through an upgradeable proxy to implementation 0x5d3936b29b244a448c6797cf1dacdd31eab812dc
- Exposes unlockCallback and liquidity-related functions (selectors 0x3073808b, 0x63158298, 0x943ab528) that indicate position or accounting management
- Reads a large sequence of storage slots during swaps, suggesting configurable or stored state
- Swap behaviour
- beforeSwap is enabled and reads many storage slots, so it runs custom logic on every swap; its precise effect is not determinable from the input.
- Liquidity behaviour
- beforeAddLiquidity is implemented and may restrict or condition liquidity additions; no removal callback is enabled. Exact conditions cannot be determined from the input.
- Fee behaviour
- Cannot be determined from decoded functions; beforeSwap is present and may adjust fees or deltas, but the logic is not visible without source.
- Owner & admin controls
- Proxy with upgradeable pattern detected; the implementation address can likely be changed by whoever controls the proxy admin slot, which could replace hook logic. No owner or parameter setters were decoded from the implementation, so further admin controls cannot be confirmed from the bytecode alone.
Enabled Uniswap v4 callbacks
beforeAddLiquidity, beforeSwap
beforeAddLiquidity: runs a check or logic before liquidity is added to the pool. beforeSwap: runs a check or logic before each swap, and the many storage slots read in that path suggest configurable parameters or state.
Security & trust assessment
Risk level: unknown (decoded bytecode, low confidence).
Who controls it: Because the contract is an upgradeable proxy, the upgrade authority could replace the implementation and change swap and liquidity behaviour for all pools using this hook.
Risk to user funds: The hook has no decoded callback that takes tokens directly, but a malicious or changed implementation could revert swaps or liquidity additions, or alter outcomes, so user funds could be affected indirectly.
Security findings
- [medium] Upgradeable proxy: The heuristic tags and proxy delegation indicate the implementation can be swapped, so logic is not fixed at deployment.
- [medium] Unverified source: Source is unverified and the implementation was decoded only from bytecode, so the exact swap and liquidity logic cannot be audited here.
- [info] Large storage layout read on swaps: beforeSwap reads a large number of sequential storage slots, suggesting substantial configurable state whose meaning is unknown.
- [info] Pre-action hooks can block operations: The hook enables beforeSwap and beforeAddLiquidity, which could block or condition trades and deposits if the logic reverts.
Contract details
- Verified source
- No
- Bytecode size
- 1,694 bytes
- Upgradeable proxy
- Yes
- Detected patterns
- upgradeable
Pools using Hook 0x3f34…8880
- ETH / MUT8 (0.30% fee) — 24h volume $20.34K, TVL $0.03, 285 swaps today