Fee sharing hook on Robinhood Chain

Uniswap v4 Hook Contract 0x4269ae981bb8ade0d6cfd30572820cd2c1b7a0cc on Robinhood Chain · Fee sharing

Volume (24h)
$0
Value locked (TVL)
$0
All-time volume
$0
Pools using this hook
2
Swaps (24h)
0 (0 traders)
Total swaps
0

What it does

A Uniswap v4 hook that splits swap-related value among a treasury, token holders, a creator and a burn share during an opening window, with tokens released through claim and settle.

How it works step by step

  • Records pool registration and creator/holder metadata at pool initialization
  • Computes swap-time deltas in beforeSwap and afterSwap and takes them via return-delta accounting
  • Splits captured value into treasury, holder, creator and burn shares using basis-point constants
  • Tracks per-pool openings with a time window (OPENING_WINDOW) and settles balances via settle and claim
  • Pays accrued owed balances to recipients through transfer and distribute calls
Swap behaviour
Swaps trigger beforeSwap and afterSwap callbacks that take and distribute currency deltas according to basis-point splits.
Liquidity behaviour
No liquidity callbacks.
Fee behaviour
Fee-like value is split on each swap into treasury, holders, creator and burn shares using basis-point constants (TREASURY_BPS, MIN_HOLDERS_BPS, MAX_CREATOR_BPS, MIN_BURN_BPS, MIN_TOTAL_BPS, MAX_TOTAL_BPS); the exact percentages are not recoverable from the decoded input.
Owner & admin controls
No owner or admin selector found in dispatch; the hook exposes a setup-style nonpayable function 0x6fc3f87f taking two address arrays that writes a storage slot (9b779b17...) read by settle and claim, so the controlling party for that array-set step cannot be determined without source. Governance-style parameters (MIN_TOTAL_BPS, MAX_TOTAL_BPS, TREASURY_BPS, MIN_HOLDERS_BPS, MAX_CREATOR_BPS, MIN_BURN_BPS, OPENING_WINDOW) are constants exposed as view getters, so they cannot be changed post-deployment. Upgradeability not detected.

Enabled Uniswap v4 callbacks

beforeInitialize, beforeSwap, afterSwap, beforeSwapReturnDelta, afterSwapReturnDelta

beforeInitialize: validates or records pool setup at pool creation. beforeSwap: computes and takes a delta from the swap, enabling return-delta fee or amount capture. afterSwap: runs post-swap accounting and an afterSwap return-delta adjustment. beforeSwapReturnDelta and afterSwapReturnDelta: allow the hook to take or give currency deltas inside swaps.

Security & trust assessment

Risk level: medium, estimated (decoded bytecode, low confidence).

Who controls it: Limited visible privileged control; the array-setting function 0x6fc3f87f is the most sensitive entry point and its caller check cannot be confirmed from bytecode alone.

Risk to user funds: The hook can take currency deltas during swaps and move tokens through PoolManager via unlock and take, and it distributes balances to treasury, holders, creator and burn recipients, so swap value and accrued owed balances are directly exposed to its logic.

Security findings

  • [medium] Return-delta fee capture on swaps: Permissions include beforeSwapReturnDelta and afterSwapReturnDelta, so the hook can take a cut of swap amounts directly from pool flows.
  • [medium] Hook moves currency via self-unlock: Bytecode includes a self-unlock path (unlock / unlockCallback) with take and settle calls, meaning the hook moves currency through the PoolManager on its own behalf.
  • [high] Unverified array-setting entry point: Selector 0x6fc3f87f writes a storage slot used by settle and claim; if access control is weak, an attacker could alter recipient or holder lists.
  • [info] Guards present but unverified: Several custom errors (NotSettled, OpeningNotOver, UnknownPool, BadSplit) indicate defined guards, but without source their enforcement cannot be verified.

Contract details

Verified source
No
Bytecode size
10,983 bytes
Upgradeable proxy
No
Detected patterns
moves-currency, return-delta, self-unlock

Pools using Fee sharing hook