Launchpad hook on Robinhood Chain

Uniswap v4 Hook Contract 0x469686b0132b0f0b091b844b3e7675386e6d6044 on Robinhood Chain · Launchpad

Volume (24h)
$0
Value locked (TVL)
$0
All-time volume
$0
Pools using this hook
3
Swaps (24h)
0 (0 traders)
Total swaps
0

What it does

A launchpad-style hook that takes a fee on swaps through return deltas and accrues it for the platform and the token creator, who can claim their balances.

How it works step by step

  • Registers pools and their tokens in beforeInitialize
  • Takes a basis-point fee from swap output in afterSwap using return delta
  • Accrues fee balances per platform and per creator address
  • Lets the platform and creator claim accrued balances via claimPlatform and claimCreator
  • Exposes launcher, PROJECT_ID and recipient getters for off-chain indexing
Swap behaviour
afterSwap takes a fee via return delta and accrues it to platform and creator balances.
Liquidity behaviour
beforeAddLiquidity, afterAddLiquidity, beforeRemoveLiquidity and afterRemoveLiquidity are dispatched as view-like selectors and do not appear to alter liquidity; no liquidity-moving logic was confirmed.
Fee behaviour
Hook takes a fee in basis points (feeBps view) on afterSwap and accrues it to platform and creator balances; the exact fee formula is not fully determinable without source.
Owner & admin controls
No owner setter selector is dispatched; claimPlatform and claimCreator are permissionless withdrawals to recorded recipients, and platformRecipient/creatorRecipient/launcher are view getters. Parameter changes cannot be determined from decoded bytecode; no owner or upgrade function was observed.

Enabled Uniswap v4 callbacks

beforeInitialize, afterSwap, afterSwapReturnDelta

beforeInitialize registers pools and records pooled tokens; afterSwap takes a fee via return delta and accrues platform and creator balances; afterSwapReturnDelta allows the hook to alter the swap delta; afterInitialize, beforeSwap and donation callbacks are dispatched but their use cannot be confirmed.

Security & trust assessment

Risk level: medium (decoded bytecode, medium confidence).

Who controls it: No privileged owner key was identified in the dispatched selectors, so centralization risk is limited; the launcher address and recipient addresses are fixed at deployment.

Risk to user funds: The hook holds accrued platform and creator fees taken from swaps and can transfer them out via the claim functions; it cannot be confirmed whether it can block swaps or pool funds.

Security findings

  • [medium] Hook takes tokens via return delta: afterSwap uses afterSwapReturnDelta to take a fee from the swap output and transfers accrued amounts, so the hook directly holds and moves user tokens.
  • [medium] Permissionless claim functions move accrued funds: claimPlatform and claimCreator can be called by anyone and transfer accrued balances to the recorded recipients; correctness depends on accounting that cannot be fully verified without source.
  • [info] Reentrancy guard present: Storage shows a ReentrancyGuard-style pattern and transfer usage, suggesting reentrancy protection on claims.

Contract details

Verified source
No
Bytecode size
5,705 bytes
Upgradeable proxy
No
Detected patterns
erc20, launchpad, moves-currency, return-delta

Pools using Launchpad hook