Fee sharing hook on Robinhood Chain

Uniswap v4 Hook Contract 0x46bb737789bc53c5a3f35cfa9f9b31064dada0cc on Robinhood Chain · Fee sharing

Volume (24h)
$0
Value locked (TVL)
$0
All-time volume
$0
Pools using this hook
1
Swaps (24h)
0 (0 traders)
Total swaps
0

What it does

This hook takes a basis-point fee on swaps through its return-delta callbacks and splits it between creator, charity and gas wallets, while strategy functions manage the liquidity it holds, and which trades pay more cannot be confirmed from the bytecode.

How it works step by step

  • Runs a Uniswap v4 hook on pool initialization and swaps, with beforeInitialize, beforeSwap, afterSwap and return-delta permissions enabled
  • Exposes liquidity callbacks (beforeAddLiquidity, afterAddLiquidity, beforeRemoveLiquidity, afterRemoveLiquidity) that are view-only in the decoded ABI
  • Uses ERC6909 claim and mint/burn calls to the pool manager plus a self-unlock pattern (unlock/unlockCallback) to move currency
  • Contains a strategy-based rebalance flow (executeRebalance, withdrawStrategy) and creator/charity/gas wallet fee splits by basis points
  • Tracks creator fees per address and a governance treasury address in storage
Swap behaviour
beforeSwap and afterSwap are both implemented and afterSwap can return a delta, so the hook can take a share of swap amounts and route it to creator, charity and gas wallets; exactly which swap direction or size pays more cannot be determined from bytecode alone.
Liquidity behaviour
Liquidity add and remove callbacks exist in the decoded interface and are view-only; liquidity itself is managed through strategy functions (executeRebalance, withdrawStrategy) rather than directly by LPs.
Fee behaviour
A FEE_BPS constant and CREATOR_BPS and CHARITY_BPS splits are present, so the hook appears to take a basis-point fee on swaps and divide it among creator, charity and gas recipients; exact amounts and conditions are not determinable without source.
Owner & admin controls
A storage slot holding an address and functions such as governanceTreasury and creatorWallet suggest privileged addresses; a setter-like selector (0xf080dac5 with address,bool) and 0xaf93a33a with address are nonpayable, so some owner or governance-controlled parameter changes are likely but cannot be confirmed.

Enabled Uniswap v4 callbacks

beforeInitialize, beforeSwap, afterSwap, beforeSwapReturnDelta, afterSwapReturnDelta

beforeInitialize sets up pool state at creation; beforeSwap gates or prepares swaps; afterSwap runs post-swap accounting and fee routing; beforeSwapReturnDelta and afterSwapReturnDelta let the hook take or return currency deltas on swaps.

Security & trust assessment

Risk level: medium, estimated (decoded bytecode, low confidence).

Who controls it: A privileged key can likely set recipient addresses, change strategy state and trigger rebalance or withdrawal, which could redirect fee flows or move liquidity.

Risk to user funds: The hook holds and moves currency via ERC6909 claims, settle/take calls and strategy withdrawals, so pool and LP funds are exposed to hook logic and to whoever controls the admin functions.

Security findings

  • [medium] Hook takes currency via return deltas: beforeSwapReturnDelta and afterSwapReturnDelta are enabled, so the hook can take a share of every swap and route it to fee recipients, which directly affects trader outcomes.
  • [medium] Privileged setter functions: Nonpayable selectors with address and bool arguments plus stored admin-like addresses indicate that a privileged key can likely change routing or enable behaviour without a timelock visible in bytecode.
  • [medium] Strategy rebalance and withdrawal: executeRebalance and withdrawStrategy can move pool-related funds through the unlock callback; misuse or a compromised key could withdraw assets held by the hook.
  • [info] No verified source: Analysis is based on decoded bytecode only, so function semantics and access checks are inferred and may be incomplete.

Contract details

Verified source
No
Bytecode size
14,470 bytes
Upgradeable proxy
No
Detected patterns
erc20, erc6909-claims, fee-sharing, liquidity-management, moves-currency, return-delta, self-unlock

Pools using Fee sharing hook