Hook 0x4902…6aec on Robinhood Chain

Uniswap v4 Hook Contract 0x4902a35302a4851ab81d57c7dc4da59fa9516aec on Robinhood Chain · Other

Volume (24h)
$4.86
Value locked (TVL)
$0
All-time volume
$4.86
Pools using this hook
1
Swaps (24h)
1 (1 traders)
Total swaps
1

What it does

A Uniswap v4 hook that intercepts pool initialization, liquidity, swap and donate events and uses swap return deltas, though its exact purpose cannot be determined without source.

How it works step by step

  • Receives callbacks from the pool manager on initialize, add liquidity, remove liquidity, swap and donate
  • Declares beforeSwapReturnDelta and afterSwapReturnDelta, allowing it to modify swap deltas
  • Exposes poolManager() and getHookPermissions() view functions
  • Reverts with HookNotImplemented for unimplemented callbacks, following the v4 base pattern
Swap behaviour
beforeSwap and afterSwap are dispatched and both return-delta permissions are enabled, so the hook can adjust swap amounts; the specific adjustment logic could not be decoded.
Liquidity behaviour
beforeAddLiquidity, afterAddLiquidity, beforeRemoveLiquidity and afterRemoveLiquidity are dispatched, but their bodies could not be characterised from the decoded selectors alone.
Fee behaviour
Uses the pool's static fee; no fee override function was decoded.
Owner & admin controls
No admin controls found.

Enabled Uniswap v4 callbacks

beforeInitialize, beforeAddLiquidity, beforeRemoveLiquidity, beforeSwap, afterSwap, beforeDonate, beforeSwapReturnDelta, afterSwapReturnDelta

beforeInitialize, beforeAddLiquidity, beforeRemoveLiquidity, beforeSwap, afterSwap and beforeDonate are declared as enabled; beforeSwapReturnDelta and afterSwapReturnDelta are enabled, so the hook can return balance deltas that alter swap amounts; afterInitialize, afterAddLiquidity, afterRemoveLiquidity and afterDonate are dispatched.

Security & trust assessment

Risk level: unknown (decoded bytecode, low confidence).

Who controls it: No owner, admin or privileged setter selectors were decoded, so no obvious key-based control was identified, but this cannot be ruled out without source.

Risk to user funds: With both return-delta permissions enabled, the hook can alter the token amounts settled in swaps and therefore may hold or redirect value. The exact logic cannot be determined from the decoded bytecode.

Security findings

  • [high] Swap return-delta permissions enabled: Both return-delta permissions are enabled, meaning the hook can take or give tokens during swaps. The decoded bytecode does not show how these deltas are computed, so their effect on user funds cannot be verified.
  • [info] No verified source or storage layout: The contract has no decoded storage layout and no owner or pause selectors, which limits what can be verified about its behaviour.
  • [info] Standard hook base revert present: The bytecode references HookNotImplemented(), a standard revert used by the v4 hook base contract for unimplemented callbacks; this is a neutral observation.

Contract details

Verified source
No
Bytecode size
2,924 bytes
Upgradeable proxy
No
Detected patterns
return-delta

Pools using Hook 0x4902…6aec