Dynamic fee hook on Robinhood Chain

Uniswap v4 Hook Contract 0x5c1990e128e557ffe2c16f2b320d6f21f6174088 on Robinhood Chain · Dynamic fee

Volume (24h)
$0
Value locked (TVL)
$0
All-time volume
$0
Pools using this hook
1
Swaps (24h)
0 (0 traders)
Total swaps
0

What it does

This hook changes swap amounts through a return delta in beforeSwap, but the exact fee rate and which trades pay more or less cannot be determined from the decoded bytecode.

How it works step by step

  • Implements beforeSwap with return-delta, so it can adjust the swap amounts or take a specified delta from the swap
  • Exposes a view function 0x4ade72ca taking an address and returning a uint256, read from the mapping at storage slot 0 and slot 1
  • Keeps per-address accounting in two mapping(address => uint256) slots that are both read and written during beforeSwap
  • Has no unlock or admin selector visible in the dispatch table, so the hook's behaviour appears fixed after deployment
Swap behaviour
beforeSwap runs before each swap and can return a delta that changes the swap amounts or takes a specified amount from the trade; the exact amount and direction cannot be determined from the decoded bytecode.
Liquidity behaviour
No liquidity callbacks.
Fee behaviour
Not determined from the decoded bytecode; the hook returns a delta from beforeSwap, which may act as a fee, but the rate and recipient cannot be confirmed.
Owner & admin controls
No admin controls found.

Enabled Uniswap v4 callbacks

beforeSwap, beforeSwapReturnDelta

beforeSwap is enabled to run logic and update the per-address mappings before each swap; beforeSwapReturnDelta is enabled so the hook can return a delta that alters the swap settlement.

Security & trust assessment

Risk level: high, estimated (decoded bytecode, low confidence).

Who controls it: No owner or admin selector was found in the dispatch table, so no single key was identified; however, the behaviour rests entirely on the immutable bytecode.

Risk to user funds: The hook can alter the amounts of each swap through its return delta, so it can take a share of user trades; the exact mechanism cannot be confirmed without source.

Security findings

  • [high] Return delta on beforeSwap: beforeSwapReturnDelta lets the hook shift amounts settled on every swap in the pool, so the hook can take or redirect user funds depending on its internal logic that cannot be fully verified from the bytecode.
  • [medium] No verified source: Without verified source, the exact conditions and amounts of the delta cannot be confirmed, so users cannot audit what the hook extracts.
  • [medium] Mutable per-address state updated on swaps: beforeSwap writes to two address-keyed mappings on every swap, so swap behaviour depends on accumulated state that may be manipulated or may gate trades.

Contract details

Verified source
No
Bytecode size
1,500 bytes
Upgradeable proxy
No
Detected patterns
return-delta

Pools using Dynamic fee hook