Likely oracle hook on Robinhood Chain

Uniswap v4 Hook Contract 0x6368185e6643f9da891f1341a76cb3fe7fd50040 on Robinhood Chain · Oracle

Volume (24h)
$82
Value locked (TVL)
$0
All-time volume
$82
Pools using this hook
5
Swaps (24h)
13 (3 traders)
Total swaps
13

What it does

This hook records state after each swap on its pool but, from the decoded bytecode alone, it does not appear to change fees or move funds, so its direct effect on traders and LPs is unclear.

How it works step by step

  • Exposes afterSwap, which runs after every swap on pools using this hook and makes a follow-up call during that step
  • Exposes register(key, address) which stores a per-pool or per-caller mapping entry in storage slot 0
  • Exposes a WINDOW() view, suggesting the logic works over a time or block window
  • Exposes manager() and getHookPermissions() views, indicating it reads the Uniswap v4 PoolManager and reports its permission flags
  • Calls extsload on the PoolManager to read pool state from storage
  • Uses a uint8 flag in storage slot 1 that is written during afterSwap, possibly tracking a state or phase
Swap behaviour
afterSwap runs after each swap and updates the mapping in slot 0 and the flag in slot 1 based on the swap parameters, using extsload to read pool state. Exact trade-level effects cannot be determined from bytecode alone.
Liquidity behaviour
No liquidity callbacks.
Fee behaviour
Uses the pool's static fee.
Owner & admin controls
No admin controls found.

Enabled Uniswap v4 callbacks

afterSwap

afterSwap is enabled and used to record or update state after each swap; no other callbacks are enabled.

Security & trust assessment

Risk level: low, estimated (decoded bytecode, low confidence).

Who controls it: No owner or privileged role was identified in the decoded functions, so no admin key is apparent from the bytecode.

Risk to user funds: No evidence the hook holds, moves or blocks user or pool funds; it appears limited to state recording after swaps.

Security findings

  • [medium] Unverified source: No verified source is available, so the intended logic and any hidden privileged paths cannot be fully confirmed from decoded bytecode.
  • [info] Post-swap state writes: afterSwap writes to storage slots 0 and 1 on every swap, so it adds gas cost to swaps and depends on state held outside the swap itself.
  • [info] No fund movement observed: No return-delta selectors or token transfer calls were found in the decoded functions, so the hook does not appear to take or move currency.

Contract details

Verified source
No
Bytecode size
4,350 bytes
Upgradeable proxy
No

Pools using Likely oracle hook