Likely dynamic fee hook on Robinhood Chain

Uniswap v4 Hook Contract 0x7062940adb1c147b8d34c965ae0fc6245d4e4080 on Robinhood Chain · Dynamic fee

Volume (24h)
$0
Value locked (TVL)
$0
All-time volume
$0
Pools using this hook
1
Swaps (24h)
0 (0 traders)
Total swaps
42

What it does

A Uniswap v4 hook that runs custom logic before swaps on pools using it, with source unavailable so its exact behaviour is not confirmed.

This read was written for the hook 0x02c1…0080 on Robinhood Chain and reused here: the two share a code shape, so constants such as fees, owners and addresses can differ.

How it works step by step

  • Runs custom logic in beforeSwap, the only callback enabled by the hook address permissions.
  • Restricts callbacks to the Uniswap v4 PoolManager via an OnlyPoolManager check.
  • Exposes manager(), token() and quote() getters, suggesting it references a specific token and pricing helper.
  • Defines a GAS_THRESHOLD constant, suggesting gas-sensitive logic in the swap path.
  • Contains dispatchers for liquidity and donate callbacks that are not enabled by the address permissions.
Swap behaviour
beforeSwap runs custom logic before each swap on pools using this hook; the specific logic cannot be verified from decoded bytecode.
Liquidity behaviour
Hook implements liquidity callbacks (beforeAddLiquidity, afterAddLiquidity, beforeRemoveLiquidity, afterRemoveLiquidity) that are present in the dispatcher but not clearly enabled by the address permissions, which list only beforeSwap.
Fee behaviour
Fee handling not determinable from decoded selectors alone; the hook only exposes beforeSwap for swap logic and no fee-setting function was decoded.
Owner & admin controls
No admin controls found.

Enabled Uniswap v4 callbacks

beforeSwap

beforeSwap is the only permission encoded in the hook address and is used to run custom logic before each swap; the other dispatched callbacks are not enabled by the address permissions.

Security & trust assessment

Risk level: medium, estimated (decoded bytecode, low confidence).

Who controls it: No owner or privileged role was decoded, so no specific privileged key capability can be identified from the bytecode.

Risk to user funds: Only beforeSwap is enabled by the address permissions; without source it cannot be confirmed whether the hook takes tokens, applies return deltas, or can block swaps. Exposure is therefore unknown.

Security findings

  • [info] Callbacks restricted to PoolManager: The contract includes an OnlyPoolManager guard, indicating callbacks are restricted to the Uniswap v4 PoolManager and cannot be called arbitrarily by users.
  • [low] Swap logic not fully determinable: The dispatcher exposes many callbacks and a quote() function, but without source the actual pricing or fee logic inside beforeSwap cannot be confirmed.
  • [info] Gas threshold check present: The contract exposes a GAS_THRESHOLD constant and token()/manager() getters, suggesting a gas-based or token-specific check in the swap path that cannot be verified.

Contract details

Verified source
No
Bytecode size
2,401 bytes
Upgradeable proxy
No

Pools using Likely dynamic fee hook