Dynamic fee hook on Robinhood Chain
Uniswap v4 Hook Contract 0x7424da83019bf770a6632d2fb6288f350a7c8088 on Robinhood Chain · Dynamic fee
- Volume (24h)
- $0
- Value locked (TVL)
- $0
- All-time volume
- $0
- Pools using this hook
- 1
- Swaps (24h)
- 0 (0 traders)
- Total swaps
- 0
What it does
This hook runs custom logic before each swap and can adjust swap settlement amounts, but from the decoded bytecode alone it is not possible to determine which trades pay more or less.
How it works step by step
- Exposes a beforeSwap callback that the PoolManager calls before every swap on pools using this hook
- Uses beforeSwapReturnDelta, so the hook can return a delta that adjusts the amounts a swap settles
- Reads and writes two storage slots in beforeSwap: a packed uint64 pair in slot 0 and a uint256 in slot 1
- Exposes a view function 0x93854ce6 that reads slot 0 (packed uint64 at offsets 0 and 8) and returns state to callers
- Logic beyond the storage access cannot be determined from decoded bytecode alone
- Swap behaviour
- beforeSwap updates storage and can return a before-swap delta, so swappers may receive or pay an adjusted amount relative to the pool's normal pricing; the exact direction and size of the adjustment cannot be determined from the decoded bytecode.
- Liquidity behaviour
- No liquidity callbacks.
- Fee behaviour
- Fee handling is not determinable from the decoded bytecode; the hook may influence fees or amounts through its before-swap delta, but no fee-setting logic was identified with confidence.
- Owner & admin controls
- No admin controls found.
Enabled Uniswap v4 callbacks
beforeSwap, beforeSwapReturnDelta
beforeSwap is enabled to run custom logic before each swap, and beforeSwapReturnDelta is enabled so that logic can return a delta that changes the swap's settled amounts.
Security & trust assessment
Risk level: high, estimated (decoded bytecode, low confidence).
Who controls it: No owner or admin selectors were identified in the dispatch table, so no privileged key is evident; however, the absence of an access-control function does not rule out hidden privileged paths.
Risk to user funds: The hook can alter settled swap amounts via its before-swap return delta, so it can move value between swappers and the pool on each swap it is called for.
Security findings
- [high] Before-swap return delta: beforeSwapReturnDelta lets the hook alter the amounts settled in a swap, so it can take or give tokens from swappers and affect pool funds.
- [medium] Unverified source: No verified source is available, so the logic behind the state updates in beforeSwap and the view function cannot be audited and its intent is unknown.
- [medium] Mutable state in beforeSwap: beforeSwap writes to storage slots 0 and 1 on every swap, so swap outcomes depend on accumulated hook state that users cannot inspect without the source.
Contract details
- Verified source
- No
- Bytecode size
- 1,653 bytes
- Upgradeable proxy
- No
- Detected patterns
- return-delta