Oracle hook on Robinhood Chain

Uniswap v4 Hook Contract 0x79dda4ed85a340441cfea400ae03e91cf7feea80 on Robinhood Chain · Oracle

Volume (24h)
$56
Value locked (TVL)
$5.89
All-time volume
$56
Pools using this hook
1
Swaps (24h)
21 (2 traders)
Total swaps
21

What it does

An oracle-driven market-making hook that places its own buy and sell liquidity bands around a price-feed center, charges a fixed pool fee to all traders alike, and appears to restrict outside LPs from adding or removing liquidity.

How it works step by step

  • Creates and initializes its own pool and blocks outside pool initialization.
  • Reads ETH and asset price feeds (with a maximum data age) to set a target oracle price for the pool.
  • Manages liquidity bands around the oracle-derived center tick, tracking buy-side and sell-side liquidity.
  • Accepts ETH deposits and tracks ETH claims, using PoolManager unlock, take and mint for its own accounting.
  • Gates third-party liquidity adds and removals through before-liquidity checks.
Swap behaviour
Before each swap the hook checks oracle prices and may reposition or update its own band liquidity around the oracle tick; stale feeds may cause swaps to revert. It cannot take tokens from swaps via return deltas.
Liquidity behaviour
The before-add and before-remove liquidity callbacks appear to restrict liquidity changes, likely so that only the hook itself manages pool liquidity. Outside LPs may be unable to add, and removals by anyone other than the hook may revert.
Fee behaviour
Uses a fixed pool fee constant set in the contract; the exact rate could not be confirmed from bytecode. No dynamic fee logic was identified.
Owner & admin controls
No owner or admin setter functions were found; feeds, max age, and parameters appear fixed at deployment.

Enabled Uniswap v4 callbacks

beforeInitialize, beforeAddLiquidity, beforeRemoveLiquidity, beforeSwap

beforeInitialize: restricts pool creation to the hook; beforeAddLiquidity: gates liquidity additions; beforeRemoveLiquidity: gates liquidity removals; beforeSwap: refreshes oracle price and adjusts hook-owned liquidity.

Security & trust assessment

Risk level: medium, estimated (decoded bytecode, low confidence).

Who controls it: No privileged admin functions were detected. Behaviour depends on the external price feed operators.

Risk to user funds: Traders' swap amounts cannot be cut through return deltas. ETH deposited into the hook is held as hook-managed claims, and whether depositors can withdraw it could not be confirmed from bytecode.

Security findings

  • [medium] Remove-liquidity gating: beforeRemoveLiquidity is enabled and likely reverts for outside callers, so only the hook manages liquidity. External LPs should not expect to deposit or withdraw positions directly.
  • [low] Oracle dependency: Swaps depend on external price feeds with a maximum age check. Stale or faulty feeds can halt trading or misprice the hook's bands.
  • [info] Unverified bytecode: The analysis is based on decoded bytecode only. No admin setters or proxy were found.

Contract details

Verified source
No
Bytecode size
10,057 bytes
Upgradeable proxy
No
Detected patterns
moves-currency, oracle, self-unlock

Pools using Oracle hook