Likely custom pricing hook on Robinhood Chain

Uniswap v4 Hook Contract 0x7a5fb26f1c33670ee7e7f53b7832adfad7634088 on Robinhood Chain · Custom pricing

Volume (24h)
$0
Value locked (TVL)
$0
All-time volume
$0
Pools using this hook
1
Swaps (24h)
0 (0 traders)
Total swaps
0

What it does

This unverified hook, which exposes a function named 'fraud', can take an unbounded, settable amount from traders' swaps before they execute, while LPs can still withdraw freely.

How it works step by step

  • Runs custom code before every swap and can change the swap amounts through a return delta.
  • Calls the PoolManager's take function during swaps, pulling tokens out of the pool to an address chosen by the hook.
  • Has an unnamed setter function taking two numbers that writes a stored amount, with no visible owner check in the decoded data.
  • Exposes a read function labelled 'fraud', and keeps a counter that increases on each swap, which suggests a test or exploit-style contract.
Swap behaviour
Before each swap the hook can take tokens from the pool and return a delta that changes what the trader pays or receives, possibly by an amount set through the setter. The exact rules and limits cannot be confirmed from bytecode.
Liquidity behaviour
No liquidity callbacks; LPs can add and withdraw freely.
Fee behaviour
No standard fee logic was identified. The hook can deduct an unknown, possibly configurable amount from swaps through its return delta and take call.
Owner & admin controls
An unnamed function writes a stored amount that the swap logic reads. No access restriction or cap could be confirmed, so the caller and the limits of that amount are unknown.

Enabled Uniswap v4 callbacks

beforeSwap, beforeSwapReturnDelta

beforeSwap: runs custom logic and takes tokens before each swap; beforeSwapReturnDelta: lets the hook change swap input and output amounts.

Security & trust assessment

Risk level: high, estimated (decoded bytecode, low confidence).

Who controls it: Whoever can call the setter, possibly anyone, can change the amount the hook takes from swaps. No upper bound is visible.

Risk to user funds: Traders' swap tokens can be deducted by an unbounded amount set in storage. LP principal cannot be locked, because withdrawals bypass the hook.

Security findings

  • [high] Swap amounts can be taken via take and delta: In beforeSwap the hook calls take and returns a swap delta, so it can pull tokens tied to a trader's swap. The amount appears to come from a stored value with no visible cap.
  • [medium] Unrestricted-looking setter: Selector 0x1dce1316 writes the stored amount, and no owner check could be seen in the decoded data. This could let someone set how much is taken.
  • [medium] Contract labelled 'fraud': A view function named fraud() is exposed, along with a per-swap counter. This strongly suggests a test or malicious contract.
  • [info] LP withdrawals unaffected: Remove-liquidity callbacks are disabled, so LPs can always withdraw.

Contract details

Verified source
No
Bytecode size
1,235 bytes
Upgradeable proxy
No
Detected patterns
moves-currency, return-delta

Pools using Likely custom pricing hook