Likely custom pricing hook on Robinhood Chain

Uniswap v4 Hook Contract 0x7c836f75159f5119e27adb391bfd7a82e6944088 on Robinhood Chain · Custom pricing

Volume (24h)
$0
Value locked (TVL)
$0
All-time volume
$0
Pools using this hook
1
Swaps (24h)
0 (0 traders)
Total swaps
0

What it does

This unverified hook takes a configurable cut from swaps before they execute, so traders may pay an unknown extra fee, while LPs can always add and withdraw liquidity freely.

How it works step by step

  • Runs before every swap and can change how much the swapper pays or receives through a swap return delta.
  • Calls the pool manager's take function, so it pulls some tokens out of the swap, most likely as a fee.
  • Stores a small configurable value (16-bit, likely a fee rate) that can be set through an unnamed function.
  • Keeps running counters (for example swap count or total collected) that can be read through a view function.
Swap behaviour
Before each swap the hook may take a share of the swap amount from the pool manager and adjust the swap through a return delta, so traders may receive less or pay more than with a plain pool. The exact deduction cannot be confirmed from bytecode alone.
Liquidity behaviour
No liquidity callbacks; LPs can add and withdraw freely.
Fee behaviour
A fee-like rate appears to be stored as a 16-bit value. If it is in basis points it could be as high as about 655%, which in practice means up to the full amount. The recipient and the exact cap are unknown from bytecode.
Owner & admin controls
An unnamed function writes the 16-bit rate. The bytecode does not show whether this function is restricted to an owner, and no cap is visible.

Enabled Uniswap v4 callbacks

beforeSwap, beforeSwapReturnDelta

beforeSwap: runs custom logic and takes tokens before each swap; beforeSwapReturnDelta: lets the hook change the swap amounts to account for what it took.

Security & trust assessment

Risk level: medium, estimated (decoded bytecode, low confidence).

Who controls it: An unidentified caller can set the stored rate, and who that caller is cannot be confirmed from bytecode. The worst case is a high deduction on swaps.

Risk to user funds: Only trader swap amounts are exposed, by an unknown deduction of up to the full swap if the rate is set high. LP principal cannot be locked or drained.

Security findings

  • [medium] Unverified swap deduction: The hook can take tokens from swaps through a return delta and the take function. The rate is set by a writable 16-bit value whose cap and access control cannot be verified.
  • [info] LP withdrawals unaffected: The remove-liquidity callbacks are disabled, so the hook can never block or charge LP withdrawals.

Contract details

Verified source
No
Bytecode size
1,134 bytes
Upgradeable proxy
No
Detected patterns
moves-currency, return-delta

Pools using Likely custom pricing hook