DamperHook on Robinhood Chain

Uniswap v4 Hook Contract 0x8dbdf613fc5bf103d1718620e15e45a6982d3ac8 on Robinhood Chain · Launchpad · Verified contract

Volume (24h)
$19
Value locked (TVL)
$43.08K
All-time volume
$1.17M
Pools using this hook
6
Swaps (24h)
2 (2 traders)
Total swaps
8,719

What it does

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How it works step by step

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Swap behaviour
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Liquidity behaviour
Adding or removing liquidity is only permitted when the sender is the controller's launcher; any other sender reverts. The hook does not alter liquidity amounts itself.
Fee behaviour
Sell-direction swaps (selling the launched coin) pay a dynamic LP fee: the 0.1% baseline plus a stress component driven by recent sell volume and an impact component driven by projected price movement against the immutable launch reserve, both decaying linearly over a 3 hour protection window. Caller may pass a 32-byte fee ceiling in hookData which reverts if exceeded. Buys pay the static baseline plus protocol fee.
Owner & admin controls
No owner or pausing found in the source. The hook is wired immutably to poolManager, stateView and controller at construction. Pool initialization and liquidity mutations are restricted to the controller's launcher address, which is read live from the controller contract, so whoever controls the controller can change which launcher is authorized. No upgrade path is visible.

Enabled Uniswap v4 callbacks

beforeInitialize, afterInitialize, beforeAddLiquidity, beforeRemoveLiquidity, beforeSwap, afterSwap, beforeSwapReturnDelta

beforeInitialize restricts pool creation to the authorized launcher. afterInitialize registers the pool from controller-armed config and seeds a tick accumulator. beforeAddLiquidity and beforeRemoveLiquidity gate liquidity changes to the launcher. beforeSwap computes the dynamic sell fee, enforces the optional fee ceiling, and burns a portion of sold coin to the dead address via poolManager.take, returning it as a before-swap delta. afterSwap enforces full fill of sells during protection, offsets sell pressure on buys, and checkpoints a time-weighted tick accumulator clamped to the launch position range.

Security & trust assessment

Risk level: medium (verified source, high confidence).

Who controls it: The controller (and whatever governs it) determines the launcher address and the launch registry. A compromised or malicious controller could authorize a different launcher that adds or removes liquidity, or arm a pool with arbitrary coin and anchor parameters. The hook itself has no privileged owner key.

Risk to user funds: placeholder

Security findings

  • [info] Sell-side burn diverts sold tokens: During the first 3 hours after launch, a portion of each sold coin amount is taken from the pool and sent to 0x...dEaD, reducing the amount that reaches the pool. This is a deliberate sink that sellers bear.
  • [low] Sells during protection require full fill: beforeSwap and afterSwap rely on a transient-style expected-input mapping; afterSwap reverts with PartialSellUnsupported if the pool's realised coin input differs from the expected value during protection. Routers that split or partially fill sells during protection will revert rather than settle.
  • [info] Liquidity is restricted to the launcher: Liquidity add and remove are gated to the launcher, so ordinary LPs cannot provide liquidity to these pools. Liquidity is fixed to the launch position.
  • [low] Swaps depend on external controller and launcher reads: Tick accumulator and launch-position clamping depend on the launcher's position() view and the controller's pendingHookConfig. If those external contracts misreport, pool checkpoints revert and swaps can be blocked.

Contract details

Verified source
Yes (DamperHook)
Compiler
solc 0.8.26+commit.8a97fa7a
Bytecode size
11,148 bytes
Upgradeable proxy
No
Detected patterns
launchpad, moves-currency, return-delta

Pools using DamperHook