Access control hook on Robinhood Chain

Uniswap v4 Hook Contract 0x9052d4015387879dda9ef356455fb58637f60880 on Robinhood Chain · Access control

Volume (24h)
$44.77K
Value locked (TVL)
$0.13
All-time volume
$44.77K
Pools using this hook
1
Swaps (24h)
596 (42 traders)
Total swaps
596

What it does

This small, unverified hook runs checks before swaps and deposits that may restrict who can trade or add liquidity, but it charges no extra fees beyond the pool's fee, so all trades pay the same, and LPs can always withdraw.

This read was written for the hook 0xd642…c880 on Robinhood Chain and reused here: the two share a code shape, so constants such as fees, owners and addresses can differ.

How it works step by step

  • Runs a check before every swap and before liquidity is added to pools that use it.
  • Includes a signature-validation function (ERC-1271 style), suggesting it may act as a smart-contract signer or verify authorization.
  • Cannot take fees from swaps or deposits, because return-delta permissions are disabled.
  • Never runs on withdrawals, so LPs can always remove liquidity.
Swap behaviour
Before each swap the hook runs a check that may allow or reject the swap. The exact conditions cannot be confirmed from bytecode, and it cannot change swap amounts.
Liquidity behaviour
Before liquidity is added the hook runs a check that may restrict who can deposit. Withdrawals never call the hook, so LPs can always withdraw freely.
Fee behaviour
Uses the pool's static fee; the hook cannot charge extra fees through return deltas.
Owner & admin controls
No clear admin setter functions were found. Only view functions and a signature check are exposed, and storage is barely used.

Enabled Uniswap v4 callbacks

beforeAddLiquidity, beforeSwap

beforeSwap: pre-swap check that may gate swaps; beforeAddLiquidity: pre-deposit check that may gate deposits.

Security & trust assessment

Risk level: low, estimated (decoded bytecode, low confidence).

Who controls it: No owner or admin functions are visible in the bytecode. Any gating logic appears to be fixed at deployment.

Risk to user funds: The hook cannot deduct tokens from swaps or deposits and has no withdrawal callbacks. LP principal cannot be locked or drained by the hook.

Security findings

  • [info] Unverified small contract: Source is not verified. The 1.6 KB bytecode exposes only view functions and no visible admin setters.
  • [low] Possible gating of swaps and deposits: The beforeSwap and beforeAddLiquidity callbacks could revert to block some swaps or deposits. They cannot move funds.
  • [info] LP withdrawals unrestricted: Remove-liquidity callbacks are disabled, so LP principal cannot be locked by the hook.

Contract details

Verified source
No
Bytecode size
1,584 bytes
Upgradeable proxy
No

Pools using Access control hook