Likely custom pricing hook on Robinhood Chain

Uniswap v4 Hook Contract 0x9678688530b2c2975bf6b1ea18bff0ecba69c088 on Robinhood Chain · Custom pricing

Volume (24h)
$0
Value locked (TVL)
$0
All-time volume
$0
Pools using this hook
1
Swaps (24h)
0 (0 traders)
Total swaps
0

What it does

This hook takes a share of swap proceeds from the pool on each trade, but the size and direction of that take cannot be determined from the unverified bytecode, so it is unclear which trades pay more or less.

How it works step by step

  • Implements only a beforeSwap callback that is reachable through the pool manager and can return a delta so the hook can take part of the swap amount.
  • Calls the pool manager take function, which moves currency out of the pool to a recipient, indicating the hook diverts swap proceeds.
  • Reads and writes two storage slots (0 and 1) inside beforeSwap, so it keeps mutable state that changes per swap.
  • Exposes a second view function 0x8a846ba6 with no decoded name that reads the same storage slots.
Swap behaviour
On each swap beforeSwap runs, updates storage slots 0 and 1, may take currency from the pool via take, and returns a delta that adjusts the swap amounts; the exact amount and direction of the taken share cannot be determined from the bytecode alone.
Liquidity behaviour
No liquidity callbacks.
Fee behaviour
Uses the pool's static fee at the protocol level; the hook takes a currency share via return delta, which is effectively an extra fee-like charge whose rate could not be determined from the bytecode.
Owner & admin controls
No admin controls found.

Enabled Uniswap v4 callbacks

beforeSwap, beforeSwapReturnDelta

beforeSwap is used to inspect the swap, update internal state and take currency from the pool; beforeSwapReturnDelta lets the hook return a delta that changes the swap settlement.

Security & trust assessment

Risk level: medium, estimated (decoded bytecode, low confidence).

Who controls it: No owner or admin functions were decoded, so no privileged key was identified; the bytecode is small and the absence of upgrade or setter selectors limits centralization risk, but this cannot be fully confirmed without source.

Risk to user funds: The hook can take currency from the pool through take and alter swap settlement through return deltas, so user swap proceeds are exposed to the hook's taking logic.

Security findings

  • [medium] Hook takes currency via return delta: beforeSwapReturnDelta plus a take call means the hook can siphon part of each swap's proceeds out of the pool, which affects traders and LPs directly.
  • [medium] Unverified source: No verified source is available, so the amount taken, its conditions and any hidden owner logic can only be inferred from the decoded bytecode.
  • [low] Mutable state updated on every swap: Slots 0 and 1 are written in beforeSwap, so the hook's accounting changes with every trade and could be manipulated by sequences of swaps.

Contract details

Verified source
No
Bytecode size
1,258 bytes
Upgradeable proxy
No
Detected patterns
moves-currency, return-delta

Pools using Likely custom pricing hook