Likely custom pricing hook on Robinhood Chain
Uniswap v4 Hook Contract 0x9b69aa60fed5c5116b3626ca1128ae04fb9b8088 on Robinhood Chain · Custom pricing
- Volume (24h)
- $0
- Value locked (TVL)
- $0
- All-time volume
- $0
- Pools using this hook
- 1
- Swaps (24h)
- 0 (0 traders)
- Total swaps
- 0
What it does
This hook changes swap amounts through a before-swap return delta, but its exact fee and pricing behaviour could not be verified from the unverified bytecode, so it is unclear which trades pay more or less.
How it works step by step
- Implements beforeSwap with a return delta, so the hook can take over part of a swap's accounting rather than leaving it entirely to the pool
- Reads several storage slots (0 through 7) during swaps, suggesting parameters or accumulated state that influence the outcome
- Writes to storage on swaps and on the 0xe623514f function, which takes two uint256 arguments and is nonpayable
- Exposes a view function 0x089ce77c returning uint256 and a view function 0x5f5fc263 with no return signature decoded
- No event or access-check selectors could be confirmed from the dispatch table alone
- Swap behaviour
- beforeSwap is called with the pool key, swap params (zeroForOne, amountSpecified, sqrtPriceLimit) and hook data; it returns a delta, so the hook can modify swap amounts and consume or supply tokens. The exact pricing logic cannot be determined without source.
- Liquidity behaviour
- No liquidity callbacks.
- Fee behaviour
- Fee handling cannot be determined from decoded bytecode; the hook may alter effective swap amounts via its return delta, which could act as a fee, but this is not confirmed.
- Owner & admin controls
- Storage slot 0 and 1 are written by function 0xe623514f, which is nonpayable and takes two uint256 arguments; whether it is access-controlled cannot be verified from bytecode alone, so admin controls are unknown.
Enabled Uniswap v4 callbacks
beforeSwap, beforeSwapReturnDelta
beforeSwap is used to run custom logic before each swap; beforeSwapReturnDelta lets the hook return a delta that changes how much the trader pays or receives.
Security & trust assessment
Risk level: high, estimated (decoded bytecode, low confidence).
Who controls it: Unknown. If function 0xe623514f is callable by a privileged key, that key could change state read during swaps and thereby alter prices or the delta applied to traders.
Risk to user funds: The hook has return-delta permission, so it can hold, take or supply tokens during swaps and could potentially block or distort trades depending on the unverified logic.
Security findings
- [high] Return delta on swaps: beforeSwapReturnDelta lets the hook alter swap amounts and move currency relative to the pool, so the hook can affect user and pool funds during every swap.
- [medium] Unverified state-changing function: Selector 0xe623514f is nonpayable and writes storage slots 0, 1 and 7; without source it is unknown whether it is restricted to an owner.
- [medium] No source available: The contract is unverified, so its pricing, fee and access logic can only be inferred from bytecode, which limits assurance.
Contract details
- Verified source
- No
- Bytecode size
- 2,121 bytes
- Upgradeable proxy
- No
- Detected patterns
- return-delta