Access control hook on Robinhood Chain
Uniswap v4 Hook Contract 0xb4fa4f928fc8da0a5a4f29a7e7362611cb16ca80 on Robinhood Chain · Access control
- Volume (24h)
- $0
- Value locked (TVL)
- $0
- All-time volume
- $17.24M
- Pools using this hook
- 1
- Swaps (24h)
- 0 (0 traders)
- Total swaps
- 20,712
What it does
A Uniswap v4 hook that gates swaps and liquidity changes through owner-managed controls such as pausing, blacklisting, and router and operator allowlists.
How it works step by step
- Checks a paused flag and reverts operations while paused
- Maintains a blacklist of addresses that are blocked from interacting
- Maintains an allowlist of authorized routers for swaps
- Maintains a set of liquidity operators allowed to modify liquidity
- Gates beforeAddLiquidity and beforeRemoveLiquidity against the same access rules
- Exposes owner-only functions to manage these lists and ownership
- Swap behaviour
- beforeSwap checks the pause state, blacklist and authorized routers before allowing the swap to proceed; it does not alter swap amounts.
- Liquidity behaviour
- beforeAddLiquidity and beforeRemoveLiquidity restrict who may modify liquidity, reading the liquidity operator and blacklist mappings and the paused flag; they do not move funds.
- Fee behaviour
- Uses the pool's static fee; no fee override or fee transfer was identified in the decoded functions.
- Owner & admin controls
- Owner (slot 0) can transfer ownership, pause and unpause the hook via setPaused, add or remove liquidity operators, authorize routers, and blacklist addresses. No upgrade mechanism was found in the decoded functions.
Enabled Uniswap v4 callbacks
beforeAddLiquidity, beforeRemoveLiquidity, beforeSwap
beforeAddLiquidity gates liquidity additions, beforeRemoveLiquidity gates liquidity removals, and beforeSwap gates swaps, each using the router, blacklist and pause checks.
Security & trust assessment
Risk level: medium (decoded bytecode, medium confidence).
Who controls it: The owner can pause all swaps and liquidity changes, blacklist any address, change which addresses are authorized routers or liquidity operators, and transfer ownership. A compromised owner key could block users or restrict who can trade.
Risk to user funds: The hook does not appear to hold or move user tokens (no return deltas or token transfers were identified), but it can block swaps and liquidity actions through pause, blacklist and router checks, so user funds may be temporarily or selectively inaccessible.
Security findings
- [medium] Owner pause control: The owner can call setPaused to halt swaps and liquidity operations for all users.
- [medium] Owner blacklist control: setBlacklist lets the owner block specific addresses from interacting with the pool.
- [low] Router allowlist gating: The hook gates swaps by router authorization; the owner controls the authorized router set, which can restrict who may trade through the pool.
- [low] Single-key ownership: Ownership is a single address with transferOwnership and no two-step transfer or timelock was identified.
Contract details
- Verified source
- No
- Bytecode size
- 5,059 bytes
- Upgradeable proxy
- No
- Detected patterns
- ownable, pausable
Pools using Access control hook
- CBARA / WETH (0.30% fee) — 24h volume $0, TVL $0, 0 swaps today