MEV protection hook on Robinhood Chain

Volume (24h)

$0

Value locked (TVL)

$0

All-time volume

$0

Pools using this hook

1

Swaps (24h)

861 (154 traders)

Total swaps

861

What it does

This hook applies an MEV-protection module to Uniswap v4 pools that can raise the LP fee for early trades and takes a protocol cut, though exact per-trade pricing could not be confirmed from the bytecode alone.

How it works step by step

• Attaches an MEV module to pools, gated by per-pool mevModuleEnabled and mevModuleOperational flags set via initializeMevModule and mevModuleOperational.
• Runs a pool extension helper (_runPoolExtensionHelper) during swaps, with an allowlist of pool extensions (poolExtensionAllowlist) and per-pool poolExtension and poolExtensionSetup records.
• Maintains per-pool fee state (feeState, quoteFees, mevModuleSetFee) and a protocol fee numerator, with a MAX_MEV_LP_FEE cap on the MEV-period LP fee.
• Uses an EARLY_PERIOD window keyed off poolCreationTimestamp, so pool age appears to influence fee or MEV handling.
• Splits fees between LPs (LP_SHARE_BPS) and protocol (PROTOCOL_FEE_NUMERATOR, protocolFee, sweeper), and tracks a locker per pool.
• Returns deltas in beforeSwap and afterSwap, meaning the hook can alter the amounts a swap settles.

Swap behaviour

beforeSwap runs MEV-module logic (pool extension helper, dynamic fee and locker checks) and can return a delta, and afterSwap settles fees and possibly takes or returns a delta. Exact per-trade pricing rules could not be determined from bytecode; the MEV-period fee cap suggests trades in the early window may pay a higher fee than later trades.

Liquidity behaviour

beforeAddLiquidity may gate additions (via a stored flag per pool) and afterAddLiquidity/beforeRemoveLiquidity/afterRemoveLiquidity are present in the dispatch table but their effects could not be fully decoded. beforeDonate and afterDonate are also present.

Fee behaviour

Fees are dynamic: the LP fee is set per pool through mevModuleSetFee and feeState, capped by MAX_MEV_LP_FEE and MAX_DYNAMIC_FEE, with a protocol share taken and a share of fees paid to LPs (LP_SHARE_BPS). The exact fee formula is not determinable from the decoded bytecode.

Owner & admin controls

Privileged functions exist (initializeMevModule, mevModuleSetFee, mevModuleOperational, initializePool, initializePoolOpen, sweeper access) and the storage writes suggest an owner or operator role; the exact role check could not be confirmed from bytecode. The contract appears to have a sweeper for withdrawing accumulated funds.

Enabled Uniswap v4 callbacks

beforeInitialize, beforeAddLiquidity, beforeSwap, afterSwap, beforeSwapReturnDelta, afterSwapReturnDelta

beforeInitialize: validates and initializes pool state before the pool is created. beforeAddLiquidity: checks liquidity additions against module state. beforeSwap: applies the dynamic fee and MEV logic and can return a delta. afterSwap: finalizes fee accounting and can return a delta. beforeSwapReturnDelta and afterSwapReturnDelta: allow the hook to take or give currency during swaps.

Security & trust assessment

Risk level: high, estimated (decoded bytecode, low confidence).

Who controls it: A privileged operator can configure the MEV module, set fees per pool, select extensions, and sweep funds, so users depend on that key.

Risk to user funds: The hook can hold and move funds through return deltas and fee accounting, and the sweeper can withdraw balances; swaps and liquidity actions may be affected by its gating.

Security findings

• [high] Return deltas on swaps: beforeSwapReturnDelta and afterSwapReturnDelta are enabled, so the hook can take or give currency on every swap and change what users settle.
• [medium] Privileged fee setting: mevModuleSetFee lets a privileged caller change the LP fee per pool, capped by MAX_MEV_LP_FEE and MAX_DYNAMIC_FEE, which can raise trader costs.
• [medium] Sweeper and protocol fee: A sweeper and a protocol fee numerator allow an operator to withdraw accrued funds from the hook.
• [medium] Pool extension execution: _runPoolExtensionHelper forwards swap context to allowlisted extension contracts; a malicious or compromised extension could affect swaps.
• [info] No source verification: The bytecode was analysed without verified source, so role checks and exact fee math are inferred and may be incomplete.

Contract details

Verified source

No

Bytecode size

24,328 bytes

Upgradeable proxy

No

Detected patterns

access-control, dynamic-fee, fee-sharing, mev-protection, return-delta

Pools using MEV protection hook