Fee sharing hook on Robinhood Chain

Uniswap v4 Hook Contract 0xc6bf34493adce78ffa13b36b26da85c93d5308c4 on Robinhood Chain · Fee sharing

Volume (24h)
$3.24K
Value locked (TVL)
$2.79K
All-time volume
$182.54K
Pools using this hook
26
Swaps (24h)
102 (57 traders)
Total swaps
10,663

What it does

A Uniswap v4 hook that skims a share of swap fees and routes them to configured recipients (owner, creator, vault, platform) while gating trading and liquidity on pool registration.

How it works step by step

  • Gates pool initialization and liquidity additions through beforeAddLiquidity and beforeSwap checks.
  • Takes a fee share on each swap via afterSwapReturnDelta and credits it as ERC6909 claims.
  • Splits accrued fees across owner, creator, vault and platform using BPS parameters.
  • Exposes openTrading and registerPool so an admin can enable trading for specific pools.
  • Lets authorized callers sweep accrued fees to their recipients through sweepFees and sweepAccrued.
  • Uses an unlockCallback to perform pool-manager accounting in a single unlock flow.
Swap behaviour
beforeSwap checks pool state and can revert when trading is closed; afterSwap takes a fee share through an afterSwapReturnDelta and records it as ERC6909 claims.
Liquidity behaviour
beforeAddLiquidity is implemented as a gate that may reject additions for unregistered or closed pools; beforeRemoveLiquidity and afterRemoveLiquidity are present in the selector table; liquidity is not otherwise managed by the hook.
Fee behaviour
Hook takes a share of swap fees via afterSwap return delta and splits accrued fees among owner, creator, vault and platform using BPS-denominated parameters (MAX_TOTAL_BPS cap), then sweeps them out; exact fee rates cannot be read from bytecode.
Owner & admin controls
Selectors openTrading, registerPool, sweepFees, sweepAccrued and the BPS/ownerBps/creatorBps/vaultBps/platformOwner getters suggest owner or platform-gated configuration; exact access checks cannot be confirmed without source. No pause or upgrade function identified.

Enabled Uniswap v4 callbacks

beforeAddLiquidity, beforeSwap, afterSwap, afterSwapReturnDelta

beforeAddLiquidity gates liquidity provision; beforeSwap and afterSwap run pool checks and fee accounting around each swap; afterSwapReturnDelta lets the hook take a currency delta from swaps to collect fees.

Security & trust assessment

Risk level: medium (decoded bytecode, low confidence).

Who controls it: A privileged owner or platform key appears able to open trading, register pools, and sweep accrued fees to configured recipients.

Risk to user funds: The hook can take a share of swap output as a return delta and holds it as ERC6909 claims until swept, and it can block swaps and liquidity actions when trading is closed or pools are unregistered.

Security findings

  • [medium] Hook takes swap return delta: afterSwapReturnDelta allows the hook to take part of each swap's output, so the hook holds a fee claim on user trades.
  • [medium] Trading can be gated by privileged call: openTrading and registerPool selectors indicate trading is gated; TradingClosed and UnknownPool errors suggest swaps can be blocked until an admin action.
  • [medium] Accrued fees swept by privileged caller: sweepFees and sweepAccrued move accumulated ERC6909 claims out of the hook to recipients; recipient logic cannot be verified without source.
  • [info] Unverified source: No verified source is available, so access control modifiers and fee caps are inferred from selectors and error names only.

Contract details

Verified source
No
Bytecode size
11,187 bytes
Upgradeable proxy
No
Detected patterns
erc6909-claims, moves-currency, return-delta, self-unlock

Pools using Fee sharing hook