Likely custom pricing hook on Robinhood Chain
Uniswap v4 Hook Contract 0xcda59d0172024fa195cb3c83d845dda2701b40cc on Robinhood Chain · Custom pricing
- Volume (24h)
- $0
- Value locked (TVL)
- $0
- All-time volume
- $0
- Pools using this hook
- 1
- Swaps (24h)
- 0 (0 traders)
- Total swaps
- 0
What it does
This hook runs custom logic on every swap in pools that use it and can adjust the amounts traders receive or pay, but the exact effect on which trades pay more or less cannot be determined from the decoded bytecode.
How it works step by step
- Exposes a manager() view returning the PoolManager address the hook is bound to
- Exposes a quote() view, suggesting an internal pricing or quoting routine is available to external callers
- beforeSwap computes an adjustment for each swap and can return a delta that changes the swap amounts
- afterSwap also receives the swap delta and can return its own delta, so the hook can settle or take amounts after execution
- Uses a Panic(uint256) revert path, indicating arithmetic or assertion checks inside the logic
- No storage variables were inferred, so the hook appears stateless or uses only immutable configuration
- Swap behaviour
- Both beforeSwap and afterSwap run on every swap and can return deltas, so the hook can alter the amounts a trader receives or pays; the exact pricing formula cannot be determined from decoded bytecode alone.
- Liquidity behaviour
- No liquidity callbacks.
- Fee behaviour
- Fee handling cannot be determined with confidence from decoded bytecode; the hook returns swap deltas which may embed a fee or spread, but no fee override is identified.
- Owner & admin controls
- No admin controls found in the decoded selectors; no owner, pause, or upgrade functions were identified, though this cannot be fully confirmed without source.
Enabled Uniswap v4 callbacks
beforeSwap, afterSwap, beforeSwapReturnDelta, afterSwapReturnDelta
beforeSwap is used to run custom logic before a swap and return a delta that alters swap amounts; afterSwap is used to run logic after a swap and return a delta that can take or settle amounts; beforeSwapReturnDelta and afterSwapReturnDelta allow both hooks to modify the trader's settled amounts.
Security & trust assessment
Risk level: high, estimated (decoded bytecode, low confidence).
Who controls it: No privileged role was identified in the decoded functions, so centralization risk appears low, but the hook's logic is fixed at deployment and cannot be adjusted.
Risk to user funds: The hook can alter swap amounts through beforeSwap and afterSwap return deltas, so it can affect the funds traders receive or pay on pools that use it; the exact magnitude depends on logic that cannot be read from bytecode.
Security findings
- [high] Return deltas on swap callbacks: Both beforeSwap and afterSwap are permitted to return deltas, letting the hook alter or take token amounts on every swap. The exact math is not visible without source.
- [medium] Unverified source: No verified source is available, so the pricing logic, fee computation, and any token custody behaviour can only be inferred from bytecode.
- [info] Quote function exposed: A public quote() view exists which may mirror the pricing used in swaps; its consistency with actual swap settlement cannot be verified from bytecode.
- [info] No storage detected: No storage layout was inferred, which suggests no mutable on-chain parameters or owner-controlled state in this hook.
Contract details
- Verified source
- No
- Bytecode size
- 1,577 bytes
- Upgradeable proxy
- No
- Detected patterns
- return-delta