OreHook on Robinhood Chain

Uniswap v4 Hook Contract 0xd3be000d2d970a00c9cfe7e1a437f5003038a0cc on Robinhood Chain · Auction · Verified contract

Volume (24h)
$6.36K
Value locked (TVL)
$6.17K
All-time volume
$1.71M
Pools using this hook
1
Swaps (24h)
1,869 (16 traders)
Total swaps
104,472

What it does

An Ore-style Bitcoin mining hook on Uniswap v4 that charges a toll on ETH/HBTC swaps and routes it into a protocol-owned ladder that burns HBTC, so traders pay a dynamic fee that feeds a buy-and-burn and miners earn HBTC emissions for work.

How it works step by step

  • Closes public trading for the first 209 genesis blocks and sweeps genesis rewards into single-sided protocol-owned liquidity
  • Charges a retargeted toll (1%-10%) on swaps via beforeSwapReturnDelta and afterSwapReturnDelta, minted as ERC6909 ETH claims
  • Records toll-denominated work per miner per 414-second block and mints HBTC emissions pro-rata on claim
  • Maintains a seven-rung single-sided ETH limit ladder below a value-ratcheting anchor, harvesting crossed rungs and burning the HBTC received
  • Pays a bounded keeper bounty from escrow to the poke() caller at the end of a successful heartbeat
  • Tracks a TWAP observation buffer and uses it to set anchors and difficulty
Swap behaviour
Exact-input only; trading is closed for the first 209 blocks. Buys (ETH to HBTC) and sells (HBTC to ETH) both pay a toll taken via return deltas and minted as ERC6909 ETH claims, with fill sizes validated in afterSwap.
Liquidity behaviour
Protocol-owned liquidity is added single-sided HBTC (salt 0) from genesis rewards via flushPol; Burn Net rungs are single-sided ETH limit bids below anchor with salt keccak(BURN_NET, generation, tier). Liquidity is added and removed only by the hook itself, not by external LPs. No external liquidity callbacks are used.
Fee behaviour
LP fee is fixed at 0 in the pool key. A protocol toll (initially 5% of buys, adjustable 1%-10% by DifficultyModule retargeting) is taken on ETH buys and ETH sells, minted as ERC6909 ETH claims and routed into the Burn Net ladder, not to LPs.
Owner & admin controls
No owner or pause function found in the ABI; the constructor sets launchDeployer and only that address may initialize the pool. No upgrade proxy observed. Toll rate is auto-retargeted by DifficultyModule and hard-clamped to 1%-10%, with no admin setter visible in the exposed ABI (_applyTollRate is internal).

Enabled Uniswap v4 callbacks

beforeInitialize, beforeSwap, afterSwap, beforeSwapReturnDelta, afterSwapReturnDelta

beforeInitialize: restricts initialization to the deployer-set pool with the exact genesis price. beforeSwap: enforces exact-input only, gates trading until block 209, flushes POL, applies toll via return delta. afterSwap: records TWAP observations, validates fill amounts, applies toll on sells via return delta. beforeSwapReturnDelta and afterSwapReturnDelta: let the hook take a share of swap amounts as the toll.

Security & trust assessment

Risk level: medium (verified source, medium confidence).

Who controls it: No privileged key is visible in the ABI: launchDeployer only gates initialize, and there is no owner to pause, upgrade or redirect funds. Users are exposed to the protocol's own deterministic rules rather than an admin key.

Risk to user funds: The hook holds ETH and HBTC claims and LP positions for POL and Burn Net rungs, and can take tolls from every swap via return deltas; funds are moved only through the contract's own logic, with no admin withdrawal path visible.

Security findings

  • [info] Deployer-gated initialization: Deployment checks tx.origin against launchDeployer and initialize checks sender equals launchDeployer; the deployer's EOA is used for attribution fallback as well.
  • [medium] Hook takes swap value via return deltas: beforeSwap and afterSwap take a toll via return deltas and mint ERC6909 claims, so the hook can capture a share of every buy and sell.
  • [low] tx.origin used for work attribution: Work attribution falls back to tx.origin when hookData is absent. This is attribution only, but bundlers or intent solvers can be credited instead of the true user.
  • [low] Swaps can revert on fill-accounting mismatch: Trading is closed during genesis and the toll is retargeted by a difficulty loop bounded to 1%-10%; bugs in these paths could block swaps via revert on partial fills or zero output.
  • [info] Incomplete source coverage: Source for several modules is truncated in the input, so emission, toll and claim paths could not be fully reviewed.

Contract details

Verified source
Yes (OreHook)
Compiler
solc 0.8.26+commit.8a97fa7a
Bytecode size
26,300 bytes
Upgradeable proxy
No
Detected patterns
erc20, erc6909-claims, launchpad, moves-currency, oracle, return-delta, rewards, self-unlock

Pools using OreHook