Hook 0xde80…8880 on Robinhood Chain

Uniswap v4 Hook Contract 0xde80dc208b857781e6046df85cb5e4fb10088880 on Robinhood Chain · Other

Volume (24h)
$13.66K
Value locked (TVL)
$0.03
All-time volume
$13.66K
Pools using this hook
1
Swaps (24h)
238 (32 traders)
Total swaps
238

What it does

An upgradeable Uniswap v4 hook that gates liquidity additions and swaps through view checks, but its actual behaviour cannot be fully determined without verified source.

How it works step by step

  • Runs a beforeAddLiquidity check on every liquidity addition to the pool, implemented as a view function that can revert.
  • Runs a beforeSwap check on every swap, reading a broad set of storage slots to evaluate swap parameters.
  • Delegates all calls through a proxy to an upgradeable implementation, so behaviour can change after deployment.
  • Exposes an unlockCallback entry point consistent with pool manager unlock interactions.
  • Contains additional nonpayable functions (0x424fcb93, 0x63158298, 0x943ab528) whose purpose is unknown without source.
Swap behaviour
beforeSwap is enabled and implemented as a view function that reads stored configuration to decide swap parameters; the exact logic is not determinable from the bytecode alone.
Liquidity behaviour
beforeAddLiquidity is implemented as a view function, so it does not mutate state on liquidity additions; it can only revert or pass. No liquidity removal hook is enabled.
Fee behaviour
Fee behaviour cannot be determined from the decoded selectors; beforeSwap reads a large range of storage slots (0x06 through 0x3e and beyond) which may encode fee or parameter logic, but the mapping is unknown without source.
Owner & admin controls
Proxy with an upgrade path; the implementation can be swapped by whoever controls the proxy admin or upgrade slot, so the logic is not fixed. No owner-only functions are identifiable from decoded selectors alone.

Enabled Uniswap v4 callbacks

beforeAddLiquidity, beforeSwap

beforeAddLiquidity: gates or inspects liquidity additions via a view check that can revert. beforeSwap: inspects swap parameters and reads stored configuration to decide whether the swap proceeds; it is a view function and cannot directly move funds.

Security & trust assessment

Risk level: high (decoded bytecode, low confidence).

Who controls it: An upgrade or admin key controlling the proxy could replace the implementation and change swap or liquidity gating logic at will, potentially blocking swaps or adding liquidity or altering behaviour for all pool users.

Risk to user funds: Based on the view-only callback signatures the hook does not directly custody funds, but the upgradeable implementation and the unlockCallback path mean an upgrade could introduce logic that blocks swaps or liquidity or otherwise affects pool funds. Exposure cannot be fully determined without source.

Security findings

  • [high] Upgradeable proxy: The hook is an upgradeable proxy delegating every call to implementation 0x04d1047a3c7a793937110919ffd0e17f838b855f; the implementation can be replaced by whoever controls the upgrade mechanism.
  • [medium] Unverified implementation: No verified source is available, so the purpose of the many storage slots read in beforeSwap and the nonpayable functions 0x424fcb93, 0x63158298 and 0x943ab528 cannot be confirmed.
  • [medium] Unlock callback present: unlockCallback is exposed, indicating the hook interacts with the pool manager unlock flow, so it may be able to act on pool state beyond the basic view callbacks.
  • [info] View-based callbacks: beforeSwap and beforeAddLiquidity are view functions, so the enabled callbacks do not directly take or return token deltas based on the decoded signatures.

Contract details

Verified source
No
Bytecode size
1,908 bytes
Upgradeable proxy
Yes
Detected patterns
upgradeable

Pools using Hook 0xde80…8880