LaunchHook on Robinhood Chain

Uniswap v4 Hook Contract 0xe6234a98ff84220ccda12985548ddab36327aacc on Robinhood Chain · Fee sharing · Verified contract

Volume (24h)
$0
Value locked (TVL)
$1.61K
All-time volume
$2.42M
Pools using this hook
88
Swaps (24h)
12 (12 traders)
Total swaps
41,337

What it does

A Uniswap v4 hook that splits swap fees between pool creators and the platform, with per-pool registration, seeding control and claimable balances for creators.

How it works step by step

  • Registers pools with creator, fee parameters and a seeding flag in beforeInitialize and afterInitialize
  • Accrues creator and platform fee balances on swaps via beforeSwap and afterSwap
  • Uses beforeSwapReturnDelta and afterSwapReturnDelta to take fees from swap deltas
  • Lets creators claim, settle and transfer their fee balances, with two-step acceptance
  • Lets the owner set a fee router and collect platform fees
Swap behaviour
beforeSwap and afterSwap accrue creator and platform fees on each swap and use return deltas to adjust the swap's currency accounting.
Liquidity behaviour
beforeAddLiquidity uses a seeded flag per pool, which implies a one-time seeding of initial liquidity. beforeRemoveLiquidity and afterRemoveLiquidity are present as callbacks. The exact effect on liquidity amounts could not be confirmed from the decoded input.
Fee behaviour
Fees are set per pool via register, which stores fee parameters (fee rates, creator fee in bps, protocol fee pips). currentFeeRate computes the applicable rate per creator, and beforeSwap/afterSwap accrue fees into creator and platform balances. Protocol fee constants are exposed as PIPS, BPS, PROTOCOL_FEE_PIPS and MAX_CREATOR_FEE_BPS. Fees are taken via return deltas, so the hook's fee split is applied on swap accounting.
Owner & admin controls
Owner (Ownable, two-step transfer via transferOwnership/acceptOwnership, renounceOwnership) can set the fee router via setFeeRouter. The owner can also collect platform fees via collectPlatform. No pause or upgrade functions were identified in the decoded selectors.

Enabled Uniswap v4 callbacks

beforeInitialize, beforeAddLiquidity, beforeRemoveLiquidity, beforeSwap, afterSwap, beforeSwapReturnDelta, afterSwapReturnDelta

beforeInitialize and afterInitialize register pool configuration. beforeAddLiquidity enforces the seeding flag. beforeRemoveLiquidity and afterRemoveLiquidity are present for liquidity hooks. beforeSwap and afterSwap accrue creator and platform fees. beforeSwapReturnDelta and afterSwapReturnDelta let the hook take or give currency deltas during swaps. beforeDonate and afterDonate are present but their use is unclear.

Security & trust assessment

Risk level: medium (decoded bytecode, low confidence).

Who controls it: The owner controls setFeeRouter, which redirects where fee routing points, and can collect platform fees. Creator ownership transfer is also controlled by the hook through transferCreator, acceptCreator and cancelCreatorTransfer, which move fee-receiving rights between addresses.

Risk to user funds: The hook can take currency via return deltas on swaps and hold claimed balances in ERC6909 and fee mappings, so it can move pool funds. Fund flows are not fully verified without source, so exposure is inferred from the selectors and permissions.

Security findings

  • [medium] Return deltas on swaps: The hook uses beforeSwapReturnDelta and afterSwapReturnDelta, so it can take or adjust currency deltas on every swap; this is the main source of exposure to user swap amounts.
  • [medium] Owner-controlled fee router: setFeeRouter lets the owner change the address that receives routed fees. A malicious or compromised owner could redirect fee flows.
  • [low] Self-unlock and settlement flows: The hook calls the pool manager's unlock callback and settle functions, and it moves currency via take and mint/burn of ERC6909 claims. Reentrancy and accounting errors could affect balances; a ReentrancyGuard error selector exists, which suggests a guard is in place.
  • [info] Two-step ownership: The owner can renounce ownership or transfer it in two steps. Two-step transfer reduces the risk of accidental loss of control.

Contract details

Verified source
Yes (LaunchHook)
Compiler
solc 0.8.26+commit.8a97fa7a
Bytecode size
13,410 bytes
Upgradeable proxy
No
Detected patterns
dynamic-fee, erc6909-claims, launchpad, moves-currency, ownable, return-delta, self-unlock

Pools using LaunchHook