Liquidity management hook on Robinhood Chain

Uniswap v4 Hook Contract 0xe81a6c79b17a9b79ea1a7797a107a49d6a7a4880 on Robinhood Chain · Liquidity management

Volume (24h)
$0
Value locked (TVL)
$0
All-time volume
$0
Pools using this hook
1
Swaps (24h)
30 (1 traders)
Total swaps
30

What it does

This hook gates liquidity additions and swaps using addresses wired in by its deployer, and from the decoded bytecode it does not change pool fees or take a share of trades, though it can affect whether trades go through.

How it works step by step

  • Hook implements beforeAddLiquidity and beforeSwap callbacks only, based on the address permission bits.
  • A one-time wire(address,address,address,address) setup stores four addresses (slots 0 to 2 plus a packed address in slot 3), guarded by an AlreadyWired error and a OnlyDeployer error.
  • beforeAddLiquidity reads storage slots 0 and 3 and can gate liquidity additions based on the stored configuration.
  • beforeSwap reads slots 1, 2 and 3 (swapper, vault and packed config) to decide how a swap is handled before execution.
  • The contract exposes view getters swapper(), wired(), manager(), vault(), house(), deployer(), poolLock() and FLAGS() for inspection.
Swap behaviour
beforeSwap is enabled and reads stored addresses (swapper, vault, house-related config); the exact branching logic cannot be fully determined from decoded bytecode, so the precise swap fee or routing effect is unknown.
Liquidity behaviour
beforeAddLiquidity is enabled and reads stored configuration to check liquidity additions; removals are not gated by a hook callback, though afterRemoveLiquidity and beforeRemoveLiquidity selectors are present in the dispatcher and may return default values.
Fee behaviour
Fee logic cannot be confirmed from the bytecode; no obvious fee override or return-delta selector was identified, so the pool fee appears to be the pool's static fee unless beforeSwap returns an override.
Owner & admin controls
A deployer-restricted wire function can set the stored addresses exactly once (AlreadyWired guard); no pause, upgrade or owner-transfer function was found, but the deployer address is the sole party able to configure the hook.

Enabled Uniswap v4 callbacks

beforeAddLiquidity, beforeSwap

beforeAddLiquidity gates or inspects liquidity additions using stored configuration. beforeSwap inspects or routes swaps using stored swapper, vault and house configuration.

Security & trust assessment

Risk level: medium, estimated (decoded bytecode, low confidence).

Who controls it: The deployer set in the constructor controls the one-time wiring of key addresses; no further owner powers were identified, but the hook's routing is fixed to whatever addresses the deployer supplied.

Risk to user funds: The hook does not appear to take custody of tokens or use return deltas, but it can influence whether swaps and liquidity additions succeed through its before-callbacks and stored vault and swapper addresses.

Security findings

  • [info] One-time deployer wiring: wire() is restricted to the deployer and can only be called once, so the connected swapper, vault and manager addresses are fixed after setup.
  • [medium] Swap path depends on stored addresses: beforeSwap reads the swapper and vault addresses from storage, so the correctness and trustworthiness of the hook depend entirely on those addresses being legitimate and the deployer configuring them correctly.
  • [medium] Possible swap blocking via before-callback: Because beforeSwap is a before-callback reading configuration state, it may revert swaps under certain conditions, which could block trades if the logic is restrictive; exact conditions are not determinable from bytecode.
  • [info] Unverified logic: No verified source is available, so behaviour is inferred from selectors and storage access patterns and may be incomplete.

Contract details

Verified source
No
Bytecode size
2,633 bytes
Upgradeable proxy
No
Detected patterns
liquidity-management

Pools using Liquidity management hook