Launchpad hook on Robinhood Chain

Uniswap v4 Hook Contract 0xe852022dd266e3df776fe12b0c48966dbd6ee000 on Robinhood Chain · Launchpad

Volume (24h)
$0
Value locked (TVL)
$0
All-time volume
$0
Pools using this hook
1
Swaps (24h)
5 (3 traders)
Total swaps
5

What it does

This hook runs only when a pool is initialized and does not change swaps or fees, so traders and LPs pay the pool's standard fee on every trade.

How it works step by step

  • Implements only the beforeInitialize hook, which runs when a new pool is initialized on the Uniswap v4 PoolManager
  • Exposes POOL_MANAGER() and LAUNCHER() getters that identify the PoolManager and a launcher contract the hook is wired to
  • Its beforeInitialize selector takes the pool key and sqrtPriceX96, and the heuristic tagging suggests it gates or configures pool creation for a token launch flow
  • No swap, liquidity, donation or fee-setting callbacks are present in the dispatch table
Swap behaviour
No swap callbacks.
Liquidity behaviour
No liquidity callbacks.
Fee behaviour
Uses the pool's static fee.
Owner & admin controls
No admin controls found.

Enabled Uniswap v4 callbacks

beforeInitialize

beforeInitialize is enabled and is used to run custom logic when a pool is created, most likely to validate that initialization comes from the launcher or to register the new token pool.

Security & trust assessment

Risk level: medium, estimated (decoded bytecode, low confidence).

Who controls it: Decoded functions show no owner or privileged setter, so the main centralization risk is the launcher contract the hook trusts, which can influence which pools are initialized.

Risk to user funds: The hook does not appear to hold or move pool funds, since no swap or liquidity callbacks or return deltas are present. It could block pool initialization if its check fails, which would prevent a pool from being created.

Security findings

  • [info] Pool creation gated by launcher address: The hook exposes a LAUNCHER() getter, which suggests beforeInitialize may restrict which pools can be created through a specific launcher contract. The exact check cannot be confirmed without the decoded revert paths.
  • [medium] Source not verified: No verified source is available, so the logic inside beforeInitialize, including any reverts, storage writes or external calls, could only be inferred from selectors and storage layout, which is empty.
  • [info] No fund-moving callbacks: Only beforeInitialize is enabled and no return-delta permissions are listed, so the hook does not appear able to take or move user tokens directly.

Contract details

Verified source
No
Bytecode size
1,287 bytes
Upgradeable proxy
No
Detected patterns
launchpad

Pools using Launchpad hook