Auction hook on Robinhood Chain

Uniswap v4 Hook Contract 0xf35b07daf879d06ce863679ed108fd6ad6ec2aec on Robinhood Chain · Auction

Volume (24h)
$48
Value locked (TVL)
$31
All-time volume
$48
Pools using this hook
1
Swaps (24h)
3,867 (2 traders)
Total swaps
3,867

What it does

This hook manages a funded reserve with dynamic fees and creator and protocol fee sharing, adjusting swaps through return deltas, though the exact trade direction and fee split cannot be confirmed from the bytecode alone.

How it works step by step

  • Implements a Uniswap v4 hook with beforeInitialize, liquidity, swap, donate and return-delta callbacks enabled, so it can modify swap amounts and take currency from the pool
  • Exposes a dynamic LP fee path: the bytecode references updateDynamicLPFee, suggesting the hook sets pool fees dynamically
  • Contains a self-unlock pattern (unlock and unlockCallback selectors) that lets the hook take or settle currency during its own callbacks
  • Holds a reserve and tracks owned liquidity, with functions for funding, finishing, aborting and withdrawing, indicating a managed fundraising or auction-style lifecycle
  • Tracks windows, candles and a max price deviation, pointing to an oracle or time-window pricing mechanism that gates swaps
  • Includes creator fee and protocol fee parameters, indicating fee sharing between the creator, protocol and pool participants
Swap behaviour
beforeSwap and afterSwap are both enabled with return-delta permissions, so the hook can alter the swap amounts and take a share of currency; the exact trade direction and fee split cannot be determined without source.
Liquidity behaviour
beforeAddLiquidity and beforeRemoveLiquidity are enabled and gated by a live/initialized flag, so liquidity actions may be restricted or routed through the hook's own liquidity module.
Fee behaviour
Dynamic LP fee via updateDynamicLPFee, with protocol fee bps and creator fee bps parameters; the fee split between creator, protocol and LPs cannot be fully determined from decoded bytecode.
Owner & admin controls
Functions such as abort, finish, withdraw and feePolicyVersion, plus an executor and manager reference, suggest a privileged operator can end, abort or withdraw from the managed process; exact access control cannot be confirmed without source.

Enabled Uniswap v4 callbacks

beforeInitialize, beforeAddLiquidity, beforeRemoveLiquidity, beforeSwap, afterSwap, beforeDonate, beforeSwapReturnDelta, afterSwapReturnDelta

beforeInitialize sets up pool state; beforeAddLiquidity and beforeRemoveLiquidity gate or account for liquidity; beforeSwap and afterSwap can adjust swap deltas and fees; beforeDonate gates donations; beforeSwapReturnDelta and afterSwapReturnDelta let the hook take or give currency during swaps.

Security & trust assessment

Risk level: high, estimated (decoded bytecode, low confidence).

Who controls it: A privileged operator or executor can likely abort, finish or withdraw the reserve, and any owner controls over fees or pausing could change terms for users.

Risk to user funds: The hook can hold reserve funds and take currency through return deltas during swaps, so user and pool funds are exposed to its logic and to operator actions.

Security findings

  • [high] Return-delta permissions with currency movement: beforeSwapReturnDelta and afterSwapReturnDelta are enabled and the hook uses take and transfer selectors, so it can take tokens from swaps and alter the amounts users receive.
  • [medium] Privileged lifecycle controls: abort, finish and withdraw selectors indicate an operator can end the managed process and move reserve funds, which could affect LP and trader funds.
  • [medium] Self-unlock pattern: The hook calls unlock and implements unlockCallback, allowing it to move currency inside its own callbacks; a flaw here could enable unauthorized settlement.
  • [info] Possible proxy or upgradeable storage: Storage is layered with many slots and mappings; without source it is unclear whether the contract is upgradeable, which would add trust risk.
  • [info] Oracle and deviation gating: Max price deviation and window functions may block swaps when price moves, a neutral observation about possible trade halts.

Contract details

Verified source
No
Bytecode size
22,773 bytes
Upgradeable proxy
No
Detected patterns
dynamic-fee, erc20, fee-sharing, moves-currency, return-delta, self-unlock

Pools using Auction hook