Launchpad hook on Robinhood Chain
Uniswap v4 Hook Contract 0xf5d1184f1a3b6d1ab93a1b1c6e778cf7651eeaec on Robinhood Chain · Launchpad
- Volume (24h)
- $427
- Value locked (TVL)
- $428
- All-time volume
- $427
- Pools using this hook
- 1
- Swaps (24h)
- 6 (4 traders)
- Total swaps
- 6
What it does
This launchpad hook bootstraps a new token on a Uniswap v4 pool and takes a basis-point fee on swaps that it routes to a fee splitter, while also gating liquidity and launch-phase trading; the exact split between traders and fee recipients could not be determined.
How it works step by step
- Deployed as a hook on a pool that is initialised by the hook itself; beforeInitialize and the launch-related selectors suggest it bootstraps a new token against a pool on the Uniswap v4 PoolManager.
- Exposes predictToken(bytes32), tokenInitCodeHash() and token() views, indicating it deploys an ERC20 token with a deterministic CREATE2 address and tracks its supply (SUPPLY()).
- Stores a launched flag and an exited flag and gates trading around a launch phase; a before-swap path reads the launch state and tick values.
- Uses an accrue() call and fee-related storage (FEE_BPS, feeSplitter) to accumulate fees and split them between recipients rather than leaving them with LPs.
- Uses unlock/unlockCallback through the PoolManager to move currency (take/transfer calls), which is why return-delta permissions are enabled.
- Swap behaviour
- beforeSwap and afterSwap both run; the hook can return a delta on swaps (beforeSwapReturnDelta and afterSwapReturnDelta are enabled), so it can take a share of the swap amount before or after execution. The exact split between traders and fee recipients could not be determined from decoded bytecode.
- Liquidity behaviour
- beforeAddLiquidity and beforeRemoveLiquidity are enabled and can revert or gate liquidity changes; the hook also manages liquidity around the launch via its tick and unlock logic. Specific behaviour could not be fully resolved without source.
- Fee behaviour
- A FEE_BPS constant and a feeSplitter address indicate a fee is taken by the hook in basis points and routed to a splitter contract, in addition to any pool fee. Exact percentages and recipients are not determinable from the decoded bytecode.
- Owner & admin controls
- A controller() view exists, which suggests a privileged controller address; the exact permissions of that role (pausing, parameter changes, fee changes) could not be confirmed from decoded bytecode.
Enabled Uniswap v4 callbacks
beforeInitialize, beforeAddLiquidity, beforeRemoveLiquidity, beforeSwap, afterSwap, beforeDonate, beforeSwapReturnDelta, afterSwapReturnDelta
beforeInitialize: sets up the pool and token state at pool creation. beforeAddLiquidity and beforeRemoveLiquidity: gate or restrict liquidity provision and withdrawal. beforeSwap: enforces launch rules and computes fees before a swap. afterSwap: accrues fees and updates launch state after a swap. beforeDonate: blocks or gates donations. beforeSwapReturnDelta and afterSwapReturnDelta: let the hook take a share of swap amounts as a return delta.
Security & trust assessment
Risk level: high, estimated (decoded bytecode, low confidence).
Who controls it: A controller or fee-splitter key may be able to change fee routing or launch parameters that affect trader and LP outcomes; the exact scope is unverified.
Risk to user funds: The hook can take currency through return deltas on swaps and can hold or move pool-related tokens during launch and unlock callbacks, so user swap proceeds are exposed to its fee logic.
Security findings
- [medium] Return-delta fee capture: beforeSwapReturnDelta and afterSwapReturnDelta are enabled, so the hook can take a share of swap amounts directly from traders and route it to feeSplitter.
- [medium] Privileged controller: A controller() address and launch/exit state flags suggest a privileged role that can influence the launch lifecycle and fee accounting; its powers are not fully verifiable without source.
- [info] Unverified source: No verified source is available, so behaviour is inferred from selectors and storage access patterns and may be incomplete.
Contract details
- Verified source
- No
- Bytecode size
- 21,045 bytes
- Upgradeable proxy
- No
- Detected patterns
- erc20, fee-sharing, launchpad, liquidity-management, moves-currency, return-delta, self-unlock
Pools using Launchpad hook
- ETH / QUIRK (0.00% fee) — 24h volume $427, TVL $428, 6 swaps today